On Fri, 26 Sep 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: > On Fri, Sep 26, 2008 at 1:25 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> What does CFJ 1895 have to do with this? When Googlebot makes PNP >>> send a message, the primal causal agent is clearly the PNP, >>> notwithstanding R2170, which forces us to tortuously look up the chain >>> for any vaguely responsible first-class person in order to find the >>> message's Executor. If PNP suddenly became a private contract, its >>> ability to send messages would not be thereby cut off. >> >> I utterly reject that notion. >> >> There's nothing tortuous about it. No matter how you slice it, there's >> a set of conscious, thinking, Turing-test-passing entities that have >> fundamental controls that are behind every shell we've allowed to register, >> that are "final" causal agents, in that things are sent because "they" >> want them to be sent. It might be a "collective" They that set an >> automatic process in motion, but it's still comes down to such entities. >> Hide the shells all you want, but we thinking entities are still the >> originating "cause" of all game actions. (Yes, I believe it ultimately >> comes down to the source of Free Will; even if Free Will doesn't exist >> we are playing agora as if it does). > > I think you're missing the point, which is that the executor of a > message *cannot be* a collective. Per R2170, it has to be a single > first-class person, i.e. a single biological organism.
Um, I thought that was the point I was making but it was comex who wasn't? I'm royally confused now. -Goethe
