On Fri, Sep 26, 2008 at 1:25 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> What does CFJ 1895 have to do with this? When Googlebot makes PNP >> send a message, the primal causal agent is clearly the PNP, >> notwithstanding R2170, which forces us to tortuously look up the chain >> for any vaguely responsible first-class person in order to find the >> message's Executor. If PNP suddenly became a private contract, its >> ability to send messages would not be thereby cut off. > > I utterly reject that notion. > > There's nothing tortuous about it. No matter how you slice it, there's > a set of conscious, thinking, Turing-test-passing entities that have > fundamental controls that are behind every shell we've allowed to register, > that are "final" causal agents, in that things are sent because "they" > want them to be sent. It might be a "collective" They that set an > automatic process in motion, but it's still comes down to such entities. > Hide the shells all you want, but we thinking entities are still the > originating "cause" of all game actions. (Yes, I believe it ultimately > comes down to the source of Free Will; even if Free Will doesn't exist > we are playing agora as if it does).
I think you're missing the point, which is that the executor of a message *cannot be* a collective. Per R2170, it has to be a single first-class person, i.e. a single biological organism. -root
