[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> Consider the following line of reasoning. Let p be the proposition 
> "Ronald was born in New York." From p, we can infer q: Ronald was born 
> in the United States. From q, we can infer r: It is possible that 
> Ronald was born in New Jersey. On the other hand, from p we can infer 
> s: It is not possible that Ronald was born in New Jersey. We have 
> arrived at a contradiction. What is wrong? 


There is no paradox if you use probability theory as extended logic to 
analyze the situation.  Let X represent our background information 
(understanding of spatial relationships and U.S. geography), and let's 
analyze the above.

1. "From p, we can infer q..."

That is, our background information X tells us that (p => q) is true.  
In symbols,

  P(p => q | X) = 1,

and hence P(q | p, X) = 1.

2. "From q, we can infer r: It is possible that Ronald was born in New 
Jersey."

That is, P(r1 | q, X) > 0, where r1 is "Ronald was born in New Jersey".

3. "On the other hand, from p we can infer s: It is not possible that 
Ronald was born in New Jersey."

That is, P(r1 | p, X) = 0.

4. "We have arrived at a contradiction."

You have, but we Bayesians have not.  There is no rule in probability 
theory that allows one to conclude P(r1 | p, X) > 0 from P(r1 | q, X) > 
0 and P(q | p, X) = 1.  You appear to be using some form of modus ponens 
in constructing your paradox, but modus ponens doesn't generalize to 
probabilities; the closest we can get is

P(r1 | p, X)
  = { since (p => q) is known to be true }
P(r1 and q | p, X)
  = { product rule }
P(q | p, X) * P(r1 | q, p, X)
  = { since (p => q) is known to be true }
P(r1 | q, p, X)

To get the paradox we would have to conclude P(r1 | q, p, X) > 0 from 
P(r1 | q, X) > 0, but probability theory, quite sensibly, does not allow 
this: it is easy to find cases where new information (p, in this case) 
should turn a possibility into an impossibility.

In a sense, what is happening in the proposed paradox is that important 
context is being dropped; this does not happen with probability theory 
because the product rule ensures that contextual information is retained.

-- Kevin S. Van Horn


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