Hiya,

Without going into the details, I'm generally sympathetic to djb's
argument here, but also do recognise ekr's "we allow anyone to get
a RECOMMENDED=N code point" as valid.

That said, if the WG adopt *anything* with RECOMMENDED=Y in this
space (incl. for KEMs) then I think the onus is on the WG to write
down guidance for the entire space, especially as there will be
codepoints for non-hybrids.

In summary: I don't think we should go back to previous policies
where we'd try prevent registration of non-hybrids, but I do think
we really need to try reach consensus on guidance text for the whole
slew of PQ possibilities for TLS. (And IMO that guidance would be
along the lines of djb's argument.)

Cheers,
S.

PS: It seems pretty ironic to me that ambiguities in NIST and NSA text
are turning out such a barrier to getting PQ stuff done when at the
same time they're some of the entities trying to (again IMO) rush a
pile of things here. (To be clear: for me, everything PQ except hybrid
KEMs is a thing for which we ought hasten much more slowly.)

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