>You mean "Google is putting massive amounts of pressure on people to try and >make sure that DTLS loses to QUIC" (or as one dev put it, "QUIC doesn't >deliver but no-one will say so in public because of Google's ire", another one >mentioned "huge amounts of vitriol from Google when we tried to push back on >QUIC").
I would certainly never say anything just to please Google, but QUIC delivers in spades, it is a large part of the whole Internet traffic and has very beneficial performance compared to TLS/TCP over non-optimal connections. QUIC also has mandatory encryption, which cannot be turned off, which is exactly how things should be. I think we should all be very thankful to Google for putting so much R&D into QUIC and SPDY and then letting everyone benefit by standardizing them (with a lot of changes) in the IETF. That said, nobody will ever use CoAP over QUIC. QUIC is not the solution to everything, but that is not Google’s fault. David Benjamin should be thanked for describing all these problems with DTLS 1.3. Cheers, John From: Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Thursday, 14 November 2024 at 03:08 To: David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org>, resea...@bensmyth.com <resea...@bensmyth.com> Cc: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org>, Joseph Salowey <jsalo...@gmail.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org> Subject: [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: DTLS 1.3 bis Ben Smyth <resea...@bensmyth.com> writes: >Datagram TLS over UDP (Userdata Datagram Protocol) is losing to Quic[k UDP >Internet Connections] You mean "Google is putting massive amounts of pressure on people to try and make sure that DTLS loses to QUIC" (or as one dev put it, "QUIC doesn't deliver but no-one will say so in public because of Google's ire", another one mentioned "huge amounts of vitriol from Google when we tried to push back on QUIC"). Peter. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
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