3GPP uses a lot of DTLS. QUIC might be a future solution for most of them, but quantum-resistant DTLS 1.3 is a must in the meantime.
>Of course CoAP specifies DTLS... QUIC cannot be used for instead of DTLS in constrained devices. It is a much more complex protocol. John From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-...@htt-consult.com> Date: Wednesday, 13 November 2024 at 21:27 To: Watson Ladd <watsonbl...@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com> Cc: Joseph Salowey <jsalo...@gmail.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org> Subject: [TLS] Re: DTLS 1.3 bis The ICAO Communication Panel has specified DTLS for air-to-ground security. That won't change without a major lift effort, lots of years, and for many of them QUIC is too new and unproven. :) Actually there are good reasons for use of CoAP over-the-air. Of course CoAP specifies DTLS... FUN! Fix DTLS. On 11/12/24 17:52, Watson Ladd wrote: I think anyone implementing would have discovered them. The other question which I'll try not to ask too frequently is at what point do we just point users at QUIC? On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 12:43 PM Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com<mailto:hous...@vigilsec.com>> wrote: > > I agree that a bis is needed for DTLS 1.3, but I think that some of the > things that David Benjiman talked about would have been discovered, > especially the keyUpdate-related things, if there had been formal analysis of > DTLS 1.3. Please have the FATT take a look. > > Russ > > > On Nov 12, 2024, at 3:29 PM, Joseph Salowey > <jsalo...@gmail.com<mailto:jsalo...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > At IETF 121, we discussed revised DTLS 1.3, aka a draft-ietf-tls-rfc9147bis. > The chairs are proposing starting this I-D as a WG item with the existing RFC > as a base. If you object to this please let the list know by 25 November 2024. > > > Thanks, > > Deirdre, Joe, and Sean > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org> > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org<mailto:tls-le...@ietf.org> > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org> > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org<mailto:tls-le...@ietf.org> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org> To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org<mailto:tls-le...@ietf.org>
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