On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusva...@welho.com> wrote:
> TLS 1.2 will very probably remain viable until quantum computers come > and demolish its security, unfortunately. As someone who has spent a lot of time working on compliance for payments systems, I have an open question to the "visibility" advocates: Can you provide a *specific citation* as to where you will be *required* to use TLS 1.3 any time in, say, the next decade? This is absolutely not the case for PCI-DSS. To my knowledge any requirement of this nature simply doesn't exist. I could be wrong but... citation needed. If there is no pressing reason for legacy systems which are dependent on "visibility"/self-MitM capability because their observability story is so poor and they can't use endpoint agents to solve the same problems, what is the case for trying to add MitM mechanisms now? The answer is simple: stay on TLS 1.2 (or earlier) until you can improve your observability story, or *specific* requirements which *mandate* use of TLS 1.3 actually manifest. From previous experience: such mandates will not be a fire drill, but will be years in the making, and repeatedly delayed due to "industry" requirements / shortcomings. -- Tony Arcieri
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