On Mon, 12 Jan 2004, David A. Carter wrote: > Habeas watermarking *may* fail if repeatedly attacked by the spammers, which > would be a shame. It will *definitely* fail if enough of us as mail > administrators freak out and pull habeas checking from our configurations at > the first sign of danger, rendering the watermark completely useless.
Sadly, customers have very little tolerance for spam, particularly after they go to the 'trouble' of configuring their spamassassin. When we get a 'flood' like that one the other day, we *have* to zero the habeas test. What I *would* suggest, to help habeas win the fight, is set-up a procmail script that checks for mail which exceeds threshold (excluding the habeas test) but which has the watermark. This is most likely spam that has abused the habeas mark. If we keep forwarding these fake habeas marks to habeas.com, it will be that much easier for habeas to prove massive mis-use of its copyrighted material (which I think influences the size of damage awards!) and help them track down a sneaky spammer faster. Of course, someone will need to manually review the habeas marked mail to verify that each one is really spam, but perhaps that will be worth the effort to stop the spammers? > This would *really* be a shame....basically letting the spammers win > without even putting up a fight. Let's put up a fight. Feed habeas reports! - Charles ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.net email is sponsored by: Perforce Software. Perforce is the Fast Software Configuration Management System offering advanced branching capabilities and atomic changes on 50+ platforms. Free Eval! http://www.perforce.com/perforce/loadprog.html _______________________________________________ Spamassassin-talk mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/spamassassin-talk
