Re: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark

2004-01-13 Thread Vivek Khera
> "AM" == Alan Munday <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: AM> If the mailer is a legitimate habeas user then surely they won't be sending AM> mail that would rate as spam anyway? AM> So if the habeas test scores 0 it should make no difference. AM> Just a thought. If all the world used SpamAssassin

RE: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark

2004-01-13 Thread Mike Batchelor
--On Tuesday, January 13, 2004 1:26 PM -0700 Nels Lindquist <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: If you encounter one shady business with a forged BBB certificate on the wall, does that mean you'll never trust the BBB again? The BBB-seal-forger doesn't lie and cheat his way onto my premises in order to ma

RE: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark

2004-01-13 Thread Smart,Dan
ilto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] | Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 9:29 AM | To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Subject: Re: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark | | On Mon, 12 Jan 2004, David A. Carter wrote: | > Habeas watermarking *may* fail if repeatedly attacked by | the spammers, | > which would be

RE: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark

2004-01-13 Thread Nels Lindquist
On 13 Jan 2004 at 18:07, Alan Munday wrote: > If the mailer is a legitimate habeas user then surely they won't be sending > mail that would rate as spam anyway? > > So if the habeas test scores 0 it should make no difference. Point the first: There are many, many other filtering products in

RE: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark

2004-01-13 Thread Alan Munday
> -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of Charles Gregory > Sent: 13 January 2004 15:29 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark > > > What I *would* suggest, to

Re: [WL] Re: [SAtalk] OT: forged habeus mark

2004-01-13 Thread Charles Gregory
On Mon, 12 Jan 2004, David A. Carter wrote: > Habeas watermarking *may* fail if repeatedly attacked by the spammers, which > would be a shame. It will *definitely* fail if enough of us as mail > administrators freak out and pull habeas checking from our configurations at > the first sign of danger,