> no, not the email address is the key, rather a unique string
> issued by the receiver to each potentuial sender.
In the system I describe, the email address *is* "a unique string
issued by the receiver to each potent[u]ial sender." This has the
charming property of working very well with the ex
no, not the email address is the key, rather a unique string
issued by the receiver to each potentuial sender.
the email address does not stop spam originating from lets say, hacked
windows boxes.
--
Greetings,
Sven Olaf Kamphuis,
CB3ROB Ltd. & Co. KG
> On 10/07/2010 04:16 PM, Sven Olaf Kamphuis wrote:
> > you just give contacts for the passwords with which you have received
> > a new one.
>
> Hi Sven/others,
>
> This very much sounds like TMDA:
>
> http://tmda.net/
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tagged_Message_Delivery_Agent
>
> Where by ea
> From nanog-bounces+bonomi=mail.r-bonomi@nanog.org Thu Oct 7 23:37:29
> 2010
> Date: Fri, 08 Oct 2010 15:38:12 +1100
> From: Ben McGinnes
> To: Leen Besselink
> Subject: Re: New hijacking - Done via via good old-fashioned Identity Theft
> Cc: nanog@nanog.org
>
&
On 8/10/10 10:00 AM, Leen Besselink wrote:
>
> k...@domain.tld for when you have a personal domain
> key-u...@domain.tld for when you have a server which understand address
> extensions
Actually I think it's user+...@domain.tld for the second one. At least
that's what I've seen for Postfix. Not
On 10/07/2010 04:16 PM, Sven Olaf Kamphuis wrote:
> you just give contacts for the passwords with which you have received
> a new one.
>
Hi Sven/others,
This very much sounds like TMDA:
http://tmda.net/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tagged_Message_Delivery_Agent
Where by each person that needs t
When was email *ever* expected to be real-time? If you need real time, use IM (the clue
is in the "I"), or pick up the phone.
if you simply run the smtpd on port 25 of the little boxy thing with the
blinking lights and the big shiney apple on it on your
desk (which has for most applications
> If i have to wait for 20 minutes for an email, i've started skype
> already.. You know what, why don't we simply turn the smtp servers
> -off- and use skype and msn for everything... saves electricity :P
By that argument, why don't we turn off the Internet and use SMS for everything?
> It may
On 07/10/2010 13:10, Sven Olaf Kamphuis wrote:
You know what, why don't we simply turn the smtp servers -off-
This is an excellent idea. I invite you to do everyone a favour and turn
yours off first.
Nick
On Thu, 07 Oct 2010 14:16:00 -, Sven Olaf Kamphuis said:
> you just give contacts for the passwords with which you have received a
> new one.
>
> each potential person that can send email to your email address, gets a
> unique password from you.
You missed the point. How does perso...@gmai
you just give contacts for the passwords with which you have received a
new one.
each potential person that can send email to your email address, gets a
unique password from you.
sending person/maillist 1 gets password abcdefg to send to b...@example.com
(no matter from which email address)
On Thu, 07 Oct 2010 12:10:37 -, Sven Olaf Kamphuis said:
> If what you're asking under point c is "what happens if a system that
> contains such a password for your email address gets compromised" the
> answer is simple, you remove that specific password from your approved
> passwords list
we have run a simular system for a while, the problem is still with
mailinglists and online shops
(by lack of a standardised field the password was put anywhere in the
email, all email not containing a password was rejected with a message to
call sales)
a) you print unique passwords on each
On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 10:14:27PM +, Sven Olaf Kamphuis wrote:
> (keep in mind, each sender gets a unique password from the receiver,
> this can be stored in the address book along with the email address
> itself).
I'd like to see the I-D which explains how this is going to work,
with particu
On 7/10/10 6:28 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
> On 10/6/10 10:34 AM, Owen DeLong wrote:
>>
>> Number resources are not and should not be associated with domain
>> resources at the policy level. This would make absolutely no sense
>> whatsoever.
>
> hmm. ... "are not" ... so the event complained
> -Original Message-
> From: Heath Jones
> Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2010 3:24 PM
> To: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Re: New hijacking - Done via via good old-fashioned Identity
> Theft
>
> Wouldn't it have to be illegal before punishments could be determi
-
Exactly when and where did RIR whois databases gain any legal status as
an authoritive source of information, rather than just an internal tool
for network operators? (as far as i see, the rirs are legally nothing more
than a collective of network operators, not an authority in any way).
-
E
>>1) Is spamming from within the US criminal activity?
>
> Sadly, it appears not.
>
> In many cases it is however actionable. (And in other cases involving
> actual criminal activity, e.g. as prohibited by 18 USC 1030, `Fraud and
> related activity in connection with computers', it may, I think, b
In message ,
Heath Jones wrote:
>> Certainly, fine folks at Reliance Globalcom Services, Inc. could tell
>> us who is paying them to connect these hijacked blocks to their network,
>> but I rather doubt that they are actually going to come clean and do
>> that.
>
>Ron, I haven't been following
On 10/6/10 10:34 AM, Owen DeLong wrote:
On Oct 6, 2010, at 6:35 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
On 7/10/10 12:08 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
so ... should domains associated with asn(s) and addr block allocations
be subject to some expiry policy other than "it goes into the drop pool
and one of
On Oct 6, 2010, at 6:35 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
> On 7/10/10 12:08 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
>> so ... should domains associated with asn(s) and addr block allocations
>> be subject to some expiry policy other than "it goes into the drop pool
>> and one of {enom,pool,...} acquire it (and t
On 7/10/10 12:08 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
> so ... should domains associated with asn(s) and addr block allocations
> be subject to some expiry policy other than "it goes into the drop pool
> and one of {enom,pool,...} acquire it (and the associated non-traffic
> assets) for any interested
so ... should domains associated with asn(s) and addr block
allocations be subject to some expiry policy other than "it goes into
the drop pool and one of {enom,pool,...} acquire it (and the
associated non-traffic assets) for any interested party at $50 per /24"?
Eric
> Certainly, fine folks at Reliance Globalcom Services, Inc. could tell
> us who is paying them to connect these hijacked blocks to their network,
> but I rather doubt that they are actually going to come clean and do
> that.
Ron, I haven't been following this anti-spam stuff much since it went
po
[[ Note: There are three more apparently hijacked blocks that are related
to the 75 specific blocks I am reporting on herein. I'll be reporting
on those other three blocks later on, but right now I just want to keep
it simple and report on just the ones relating to directnet.net. ]]
S
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