Re: Key generation, subkeys and improved documentation

2015-01-06 Thread Sandeep Murthy
Just out of curiosity I wanted to know the kind of numbers we are dealing with if we use keys with length 16384. Here’s the biggest :) 118973149535723176508575932662800713076344468709651023747267482 123326135818048368690448859547261203991511543748483930925889766 738130868742627452469834156500608

RE: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh
Hi, Just to add clarification: Locke-ian philosophy posits innocent until proven guilty. Napoleonic posits guilty until proven innocent. Both systems of justice are currently in practice in various parts of the world. The United States is founded on the Locke-ian philosophy which is the one I

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Mirimir
On 01/06/2015 09:30 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I understand you [MFPA] believe there is a right to be forgotten; I > hope you will understand I consider that to be Pollyannic fantasy. Indeed. I agree. But what about a right to authenticated pseudonymity? ___

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> Aside from only demonstrating possible earlier intent rather later > actions, the fraction of comments of "I'll kill you" that actually convert to > murders is vanishingly small. If I were a juror, this evidence would > tell me nothing about guilt or otherwise. Sure it does — premeditation. Mur

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Mirimir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/06/2015 08:29 PM, MFPA wrote: > Hi > > > On Wednesday 7 January 2015 at 2:14:43 AM, in > , Mirimir wrote: > > > >> I also favor compartmentalization. But reading >> , I don't see any requirement to >> include all online

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 7 January 2015 at 3:27:10 AM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Unfortunately, unless you’re psychic this is > impossible. You don’t know what information will be > relevant. You’ll never discover “the dead guy spilled > a hot cof

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Sandeep Murthy
Hi I like the idea of Keybase, although it may appear ironic that an application designed to encourage people to protect their privacy by using encryption more widely and accessibly may require the storage and public monitoring of digital identity records. I think it shows there must be give and

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 7 January 2015 at 2:14:43 AM, in , Mirimir wrote: > I also favor compartmentalization. But reading > , I don't see any requirement to > include all online identity information, provide > government-issued ID,

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> We know he was standing with a smoking gun, close to a body on the > ground. We should be investigating what happened, not wasting our time > with yesterday's food and the last three years' commuting habits. Unfortunately, unless you’re psychic this is impossible. You don’t know what informati

Re: Key generation, subkeys and improved documentation

2015-01-06 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 5 January 2015 at 10:46:54 PM, in , Nex6|Bill wrote: > But I have seen some of the more > paranoid privacy folks doing 4096 key pairs. I'm sure I have even seen discussions about 16384-bit. I seem to recall somebody posting where t

Re: Untrusted certificate for https://wiki.gnupg.org/

2015-01-06 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 5 January 2015 at 10:07:27 PM, in , Alexander Buchner wrote: > In https://www.gnupg.org/blog/index.html there is link > to https://wiki.gnupg.org/ which is kind of broken, > because the site's certificate is untrusted due to an > inc

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Mirimir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/06/2015 06:04 PM, MFPA wrote: > Anyway, we have gone *way* off-topic. My original comment was intended > to convey my general opinion that a publicly-known dossier of > unrelated "identity" events sounds far too invasive to be comfortable. > A

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Tuesday 6 January 2015 at 2:14:20 PM, in , Mark H. Wood wrote: > True. But we have established an identity between him > and a person of interest in the case. Investigation of > that interest is going to require some more identities > ("

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Tuesday 6 January 2015 at 1:22:47 AM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Yes, which is plenty sufficient to soothe my conscience > about invasive measures. To me, that is tantamount to saying "If we think he did this but can't prove it; let's

Re: Thoughts on Keybase

2015-01-06 Thread Mark H. Wood
On Mon, Jan 05, 2015 at 08:22:47PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > We only *suspect* that: we saw him holding a smoking gun but did not > > actually see him fire it. True. But we have established an identity between him and a person of interest in the case. Investigation of that interest is

Re: Untrusted certificate for https://wiki.gnupg.org/

2015-01-06 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015 12:18, alexander.buch...@posteo.de said: > We both know that almost nobody installs additional certificates. > So why don't just get a proper certificate like for gnupg.org with a > complete trust path? Well, wiki.gnupg.org is run by the folks from Intevation and they use ther

Updating public key problem

2015-01-06 Thread gnupgpacker
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello, did anyone get a response from encrypt.to? Btw and sorry for this question: Seems https://encrypt.to to be a reliable service regarding data security? Transmission of newly created messages are transferred from browser window to encrypt.to-se

Re: Untrusted certificate for https://wiki.gnupg.org/

2015-01-06 Thread Alexander Buchner
On 06.01.2015 10:23, Werner Koch wrote: > You merely need to install the right root certificate. Or add an > exception. Unfortunately is is hard to get root certificates installed > by default into browsers unless you are a TLA. We both know that almost nobody installs additional certificates. S

Re: Key generation, subkeys and improved documentation

2015-01-06 Thread Werner Koch
On Mon, 5 Jan 2015 16:54, s.mur...@mykolab.com said: > I thought the maximum was 4096? For example, GPGKeychain (the GUI keychain Yes, but the gpgtools folks modified GnuPG to allow for 8k. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___

Re: Untrusted certificate for https://wiki.gnupg.org/

2015-01-06 Thread Werner Koch
On Mon, 5 Jan 2015 23:07, alexander.buch...@posteo.de said: > In https://www.gnupg.org/blog/index.html there is link to > https://wiki.gnupg.org/ which is kind of broken, because the site's > certificate is untrusted due to an incomplete certificate chain. You merely need to install the right roo