cdr wrote:
> MUS1876 wrote:
>> Alphax wrote:
>>> I have friends who currently don't want to use PGP because they
>>> fear that their keys will be uploaded to a keyserver, and then
>>> they will be spammed forever more.
>>
>>
>> I totally agree what friends of Alphax say.
>>
>> Wouldn't it be cute t
David Shaw wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 09:27:54PM +0200, Johan Wevers wrote:
>
>>David Shaw wrote:
>>
>>
>>>I have sympathy for that argument, so wouldn't it be good to trace
>>>down where the sigs are entering the keyserver net, and ask whoever is
>>>doing it to stop? It seems like the obvi
On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 09:59:53AM -0500, John Clizbe wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
> > There is perhaps an argument to be made for a "super clean" that does
> > clean and also removes any signature where the signing key is not
> > present (in fact, an early version of clean did that), but that's a
>
On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 07:58:57PM -0600, Kurt Fitzner wrote:
> > It might be useful to tone down the rage here. PGP isn't producing
> > toxic waste. They're producing small packets of binary data. Nobody
> > is actually being poisoned and dying here. Extra signatures on keys
> > do not actual
On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 03:00:31PM +0200, Johan Wevers wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
>
> >Known by *you*. I rather think the GD is a good signer, for what it
> >is.
>
> I think both of you need to make a difference between a bad signer that
> signs keys without doing sufficient checking, and a sign
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 09:27:54PM +0200, Johan Wevers wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
>
> >I have sympathy for that argument, so wouldn't it be good to trace
> >down where the sigs are entering the keyserver net, and ask whoever is
> >doing it to stop? It seems like the obvious first step.
>
> Assum
Kurt Fitzner wrote:
>Signature cleaning and/or filtering is not the answer, just as spam
>filtering is not the ultimate answer.
I prefer spam filtering it over laws that compromise privacy as a side
effect, but that's another discussion.
However, your comparison doesn't work. Email spammers are
David Shaw wrote:
>I have sympathy for that argument, so wouldn't it be good to trace
>down where the sigs are entering the keyserver net, and ask whoever is
>doing it to stop? It seems like the obvious first step.
Assuming this is possible at all. I don't know exctly what keyservers log,
but I'
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Bob Henson wrote:
> A P.S. to the last message. I added the above lines and tried again, and
> neither refreshing a key from the keyserver, uploading a key, nor
> downloading a new key cause the "clean" to run.
>
> I must be doing something silly in
MUS1876 wrote:
I have
friends who currently don't want to use PGP because they fear that
>>their
keys will be uploaded to a keyserver, and then they will be spammed
forever more.
I totally agree what friends of Alphax say.
Wouldn't it be cute to have a sepcial option to flag both keys and
s
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 01:33:45PM +0930, Alphax wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 02:00:38PM -0600, Kurt Fitzner wrote:
>
> That poses a significant problem when someone loses their key, but has a
> trusted revoker set... there are other situations where someone other
I mean only key signatures,
David Shaw wrote:
>Known by *you*. I rather think the GD is a good signer, for what it
>is.
I think both of you need to make a difference between a bad signer that
signs keys without doing sufficient checking, and a signer that spams
signatures in quantities that could become a DOS attack. The G
>Message: 1
>Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2005 01:27:02 -0500
>From: John B <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Hushmail troubles...again
>To: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
>Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> I've tried over the past week to send encrypted e-mails to a
>fri
Bob Henson wrote:
>
> A P.S. to the last message. I added the above lines and tried again,
> > and neither refreshing a key from the keyserver, uploading a key,
> nor downloading a new key cause the "clean" to run.
>
> I must be doing something silly in the set-up. I created a new file
> in the s
Doug Barton wrote:
>> Bob Henson wrote:
>>
>
Put it the other way round - what useful purpose do they serve? I haven't
seen one yet, ergo they are junk.
>
>>
>> Um, until you actually get appointed ruler of the universe, you don't get to
>> make that decision for everyone else. :) Seri
Doug Barton wrote:
> Bob Henson wrote:
>
>> Put it the other way round - what useful purpose do they serve? I haven't
>> seen one yet, ergo they are junk.
>
> Um, until you actually get appointed ruler of the universe, you don't get to
> make that decision for everyone else. :) Seriously though,
Alphax wrote:
>
> I don't suppose any keyserver operators could tell us the specs on their
> machines...
>
IMO, more important factor is the number of uploaded keys per hour or
day. If a keyserver receives e.g. 100 keys per day, this work could be
easily handled by 486/66MHz.
signature.asc
Desc
Zeljko Vrba wrote:
> Alphax wrote:
>
>>However, the keyserver would then have to verify the signature of the
>>uploading key... how much of an extra burden would this be?
>>
>
> In what way "extra burden"? Computationally (CPU), programming
> complexity, or...?
>
> Computationally - it would be
Alphax wrote:
>
> However, the keyserver would then have to verify the signature of the
> uploading key... how much of an extra burden would this be?
>
In what way "extra burden"? Computationally (CPU), programming
complexity, or...?
Computationally - it would be done only oncem on key upload. I
Zeljko Vrba wrote:
> Pawel Shajdo wrote:
>
>>I think this is public more keyservers design problem than GD. Keyserver
>>should accept new signatures only from key owner.
>>
>
>
> Hm, maybe to define a "key upload format" which must be signed with the
> uploaded key itself (analogon of PKCS#10)?
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