Specifics?

Phil

@independentid
www.independentid.com
phil.h...@oracle.com







On 2013-08-22, at 1:52 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> True however this is more like a client cert and that didn't take off because 
> of distribution and maintenance issues. 
> 
> On 2013-08-22, at 4:43 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
>> TLS doesn't define how servers obtain certificates. It just assumes they are 
>> installed.  The same thing is happening here.
>> 
>> I'm not sure why this is objectionable. It is simply a broader model of your 
>> proprietary (meaning specific) solution for BB+.
>> 
>> Phil
>> 
>> @independentid
>> www.independentid.com
>> phil.h...@oracle.com
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 2013-08-22, at 1:18 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org> wrote:
>> 
>>> But it also assumes, in many cases, a pre-registration step. I think you 
>>> might be simplifying for the case of one piece of software with the same 
>>> parameters talking to the same server many times. In some sense, it doesn't 
>>> matter to a client developer whether they have to send their display name 
>>> as part of a JSON object or as part of a signed JWT (though the former's 
>>> simpler, the results are the same), they still have to send it to the 
>>> server. You kick the can down the road and set up something where there's a 
>>> pre-registration step where common elements of the client's registration 
>>> are fixed -- but then the server's going to have to be able to get those 
>>> common elements at registration time and (later) at authorization time. 
>>> Unless you're building inside of a single security domain, this becomes 
>>> tricky, with all kinds of trust and policy issues. But it's useful and it 
>>> can be done -- that's what we did with the "trusted registration" extension 
>>> that BB+ uses, with registries and discovery using the initial access 
>>> token. The server effectively parses the initial access token and looks up 
>>> information about the client at the registry. We also toyed with the idea 
>>> of packing the registration information into the token itself. Either way, 
>>> the server has to decide that it trusts whoever issued that token, and it 
>>> has to be able to verify the token's veracity. In BB+, we're using 
>>> discovery to find the JWK that was used to sign the token and (optionally) 
>>> token introspection to verify that the initial access token hasn't been 
>>> decomissioned by the registry server. In this case, it's the registry that 
>>> holds the fixed information about the client -- not the auth server -- and 
>>> so the trust model is different.
>>> 
>>> I think we're better off starting with the fully open case, where neither 
>>> the app nor the server really know anything about each other, and build 
>>> from there. We know that that's a case that people want to solve. Note that 
>>> BB+ builds directly on what's already there -- you don't have to burn down 
>>> the house in order to hang a painting. I think that there are so many 
>>> similarities between the two that the software statement work can do the 
>>> same. 
>>> 
>>> I'd also like to point out something about passing client information 
>>> around: in the "fully stateless assertion" world that's being proposed 
>>> (where there *is* no registration step), the client ends up passing its 
>>> full registration information (as a software statement) with *every* call 
>>> to the authorization endpoint. The fact that the registration is encoded in 
>>> an assertion is immaterial. Having the server be truly stateless 
>>> dramatically increases the amount of information sent over the wire at 
>>> runtime -- that's a pretty universal tradeoff, and that's not a cost that 
>>> everyone wants to pay. 
>>> 
>>>  -- Justin
>>> 
>>> On 08/22/2013 03:57 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>> Agreed. 
>>>> 
>>>> The problem for dyn reg is most params are optional and passed at reg 
>>>> time. I think this also represents huge complexity to client app 
>>>> developers since each sp may be different. Move bulk of info to statement 
>>>> simplifies the registration and encourages uniformity. 
>>>> 
>>>> Phil
>>>> 
>>>> On 2013-08-22, at 12:53, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Phil, thanks for writing this down. I think that part of the confusion in 
>>>>> this conversation may come from the nature of items such as the client 
>>>>> id, client secret, and even the registration access token. In many 
>>>>> instances, these are simply random values that the server generates and 
>>>>> stores for later use. However, as you point out, OAuth doesn't state that 
>>>>> that has to be the case any more than it states that a server must store 
>>>>> access tokens. The important thing is that the auth server be able to 
>>>>> recognize and verify each of these values. As such, nothing is stopping 
>>>>> the server from staying stateless and sending signed values to the client 
>>>>> for each or all of these fields, much in same way that a server can issue 
>>>>> signed access tokens that carry all their rights and state within. As 
>>>>> long as all of these values remain opaque to the client, everything in 
>>>>> OAuth still works. It also works fine within the current DynReg 
>>>>> framework, as John has just pointed out under a separate thread.
>>>>> 
>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 08/22/2013 03:22 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>> I have attached a PDF including some of my thoughts, concerns, and 
>>>>>> suggestions for the upcoming meeting.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> @independentid
>>>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 2013-08-22, at 4:06 AM, "Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)" 
>>>>>> <hannes.tschofe...@nsn.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> > I messed up the conference bridge time; here is the corrected version 
>>>>>> > but the details are actually the same. 
>>>>>> > 
>>>>>> > Meeting Number: 702 442 101 
>>>>>> > Meeting Password: oauth 
>>>>>> > 
>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>>> > To join the online meeting 
>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>>> > 1. Go to 
>>>>>> > https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&RT=MiMyNQ%3D%3D
>>>>>> >                      
>>>>>> > 2. Enter your name and email address. 
>>>>>> > 3. Enter the meeting password: oauth 
>>>>>> > 4. Click "Join Now". 
>>>>>> > 
>>>>>> > To view in other time zones or languages, please click the link: 
>>>>>> > https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&ORT=MiMyNQ%3D%3D
>>>>>> >  
>>>>>> > 
>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>>> > To join the Teleconference 
>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>>> > Global dial-in numbers: http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/nvc 
>>>>>> > Conference Code: 944 910 5485 
>>>>>> > 
>>>>>> > To update this meeting to your calendar program (for example Microsoft 
>>>>>> > Outlook), click this link: 
>>>>>> > https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&ICS=MRS3&LD=1&RD=2&ST=1&SHA2=KseMD/IKx0YGjSRaNyDJbqnmJ2i-xirziLGyc2bHNI8=&RT=MiMyNQ%3D%3D
>>>>>> > 
>>>>>> >> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> >> From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
>>>>>> >> Of ext Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>>>>>> >> Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 6:35 PM
>>>>>> >> To: oauth mailing list
>>>>>> >> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration Conference Call: Thu 
>>>>>> >> 22
>>>>>> >> Aug, 2pm PDT: Conference Bridge Details
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> Here is the conference bridge and Webex information.
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> From an agenda point of view I guess we should start at a basic level,
>>>>>> >> namely with what we have already in the dynamic client registration
>>>>>> >> document (and folks may have actually missed it). There are two use
>>>>>> >> cases described in the WG document, namely
>>>>>> >> - Use Case #1: Open Registration (Appendix B.1)
>>>>>> >> - Use Case #2: Protected Registration (Appendix B.2)
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> Then, we could talk about some more sophisticated use cases where
>>>>>> >> information for protected registration is provided by a third party.
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> --------------------
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> Meeting Number: 702 442 101
>>>>>> >> Meeting Password: oauth
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> >> To join the online meeting
>>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> >> 1. Go to
>>>>>> >> https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&RT=
>>>>>> >> MiMzMA%3D%3D
>>>>>> >> 2. Enter your name and email address.
>>>>>> >> 3. Enter the meeting password: oauth
>>>>>> >> 4. Click "Join Now".
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> To view in other time zones or languages, please click the link:
>>>>>> >> https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&ORT
>>>>>> >> =MiMzMA%3D%3D
>>>>>> >> 
>>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> >> To join the teleconference only
>>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> >> Global Dial-In Numbers: http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/nvc
>>>>>> >> Conference Code: 944 910 5485
>>>>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> >> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 

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