True however this is more like a client cert and that didn't take off because 
of distribution and maintenance issues. 

On 2013-08-22, at 4:43 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote:

> TLS doesn't define how servers obtain certificates. It just assumes they are 
> installed.  The same thing is happening here.
> 
> I'm not sure why this is objectionable. It is simply a broader model of your 
> proprietary (meaning specific) solution for BB+.
> 
> Phil
> 
> @independentid
> www.independentid.com
> phil.h...@oracle.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 2013-08-22, at 1:18 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org> wrote:
> 
>> But it also assumes, in many cases, a pre-registration step. I think you 
>> might be simplifying for the case of one piece of software with the same 
>> parameters talking to the same server many times. In some sense, it doesn't 
>> matter to a client developer whether they have to send their display name as 
>> part of a JSON object or as part of a signed JWT (though the former's 
>> simpler, the results are the same), they still have to send it to the 
>> server. You kick the can down the road and set up something where there's a 
>> pre-registration step where common elements of the client's registration are 
>> fixed -- but then the server's going to have to be able to get those common 
>> elements at registration time and (later) at authorization time. Unless 
>> you're building inside of a single security domain, this becomes tricky, 
>> with all kinds of trust and policy issues. But it's useful and it can be 
>> done -- that's what we did with the "trusted registration" extension that 
>> BB+ uses, with registries and discovery using the initial access token. The 
>> server effectively parses the initial access token and looks up information 
>> about the client at the registry. We also toyed with the idea of packing the 
>> registration information into the token itself. Either way, the server has 
>> to decide that it trusts whoever issued that token, and it has to be able to 
>> verify the token's veracity. In BB+, we're using discovery to find the JWK 
>> that was used to sign the token and (optionally) token introspection to 
>> verify that the initial access token hasn't been decomissioned by the 
>> registry server. In this case, it's the registry that holds the fixed 
>> information about the client -- not the auth server -- and so the trust 
>> model is different.
>> 
>> I think we're better off starting with the fully open case, where neither 
>> the app nor the server really know anything about each other, and build from 
>> there. We know that that's a case that people want to solve. Note that BB+ 
>> builds directly on what's already there -- you don't have to burn down the 
>> house in order to hang a painting. I think that there are so many 
>> similarities between the two that the software statement work can do the 
>> same. 
>> 
>> I'd also like to point out something about passing client information 
>> around: in the "fully stateless assertion" world that's being proposed 
>> (where there *is* no registration step), the client ends up passing its full 
>> registration information (as a software statement) with *every* call to the 
>> authorization endpoint. The fact that the registration is encoded in an 
>> assertion is immaterial. Having the server be truly stateless dramatically 
>> increases the amount of information sent over the wire at runtime -- that's 
>> a pretty universal tradeoff, and that's not a cost that everyone wants to 
>> pay. 
>> 
>>  -- Justin
>> 
>> On 08/22/2013 03:57 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>> Agreed. 
>>> 
>>> The problem for dyn reg is most params are optional and passed at reg time. 
>>> I think this also represents huge complexity to client app developers since 
>>> each sp may be different. Move bulk of info to statement simplifies the 
>>> registration and encourages uniformity. 
>>> 
>>> Phil
>>> 
>>> On 2013-08-22, at 12:53, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Phil, thanks for writing this down. I think that part of the confusion in 
>>>> this conversation may come from the nature of items such as the client id, 
>>>> client secret, and even the registration access token. In many instances, 
>>>> these are simply random values that the server generates and stores for 
>>>> later use. However, as you point out, OAuth doesn't state that that has to 
>>>> be the case any more than it states that a server must store access 
>>>> tokens. The important thing is that the auth server be able to recognize 
>>>> and verify each of these values. As such, nothing is stopping the server 
>>>> from staying stateless and sending signed values to the client for each or 
>>>> all of these fields, much in same way that a server can issue signed 
>>>> access tokens that carry all their rights and state within. As long as all 
>>>> of these values remain opaque to the client, everything in OAuth still 
>>>> works. It also works fine within the current DynReg framework, as John has 
>>>> just pointed out under a separate thread.
>>>> 
>>>>  -- Justin
>>>> 
>>>> On 08/22/2013 03:22 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>> I have attached a PDF including some of my thoughts, concerns, and 
>>>>> suggestions for the upcoming meeting.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Phil
>>>>> 
>>>>> @independentid
>>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 2013-08-22, at 4:06 AM, "Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)" 
>>>>> <hannes.tschofe...@nsn.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> > I messed up the conference bridge time; here is the corrected version 
>>>>> > but the details are actually the same. 
>>>>> > 
>>>>> > Meeting Number: 702 442 101 
>>>>> > Meeting Password: oauth 
>>>>> > 
>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>> > To join the online meeting 
>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>> > 1. Go to 
>>>>> > https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&RT=MiMyNQ%3D%3D
>>>>> >  
>>>>> > 2. Enter your name and email address. 
>>>>> > 3. Enter the meeting password: oauth 
>>>>> > 4. Click "Join Now". 
>>>>> > 
>>>>> > To view in other time zones or languages, please click the link: 
>>>>> > https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&ORT=MiMyNQ%3D%3D
>>>>> >  
>>>>> > 
>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>> > To join the Teleconference 
>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------- 
>>>>> > Global dial-in numbers: http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/nvc 
>>>>> > Conference Code: 944 910 5485 
>>>>> > 
>>>>> > To update this meeting to your calendar program (for example Microsoft 
>>>>> > Outlook), click this link: 
>>>>> > https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&ICS=MRS3&LD=1&RD=2&ST=1&SHA2=KseMD/IKx0YGjSRaNyDJbqnmJ2i-xirziLGyc2bHNI8=&RT=MiMyNQ%3D%3D
>>>>> > 
>>>>> >> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> >> From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
>>>>> >> Of ext Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>>>>> >> Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 6:35 PM
>>>>> >> To: oauth mailing list
>>>>> >> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration Conference Call: Thu 22
>>>>> >> Aug, 2pm PDT: Conference Bridge Details
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> Here is the conference bridge and Webex information.
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> From an agenda point of view I guess we should start at a basic level,
>>>>> >> namely with what we have already in the dynamic client registration
>>>>> >> document (and folks may have actually missed it). There are two use
>>>>> >> cases described in the WG document, namely
>>>>> >> - Use Case #1: Open Registration (Appendix B.1)
>>>>> >> - Use Case #2: Protected Registration (Appendix B.2)
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> Then, we could talk about some more sophisticated use cases where
>>>>> >> information for protected registration is provided by a third party.
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> --------------------
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> Meeting Number: 702 442 101
>>>>> >> Meeting Password: oauth
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> >> To join the online meeting
>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> >> 1. Go to
>>>>> >> https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&RT=
>>>>> >> MiMzMA%3D%3D
>>>>> >> 2. Enter your name and email address.
>>>>> >> 3. Enter the meeting password: oauth
>>>>> >> 4. Click "Join Now".
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> To view in other time zones or languages, please click the link:
>>>>> >> https://nsn.webex.com/nsn/j.php?ED=268691357&UID=0&PW=NOTlkZjIwNTEy&ORT
>>>>> >> =MiMzMA%3D%3D
>>>>> >> 
>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> >> To join the teleconference only
>>>>> >> -------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> >> Global Dial-In Numbers: http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/nvc
>>>>> >> Conference Code: 944 910 5485
>>>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>>>> >> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>> 
>> 
> 
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