I don't have enough time at the moment but I can try to create some simple
examples with the help of Claude and Gemini in the next days. As they say all
models are wrong but some are useful. I have the feeling this model is useful
but I need more time to answer the questions-J.
-------- Original message --------From: glen <[email protected]> Date: 10/6/26
4:39 PM (GMT+01:00) To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A field theory
of understanding OK. That's somewhat helpful. But what we need are numbers,
right?So let's go with H_k(•) being a/the primary binding point. How do we
measure it? What is it in the person's physiology that we measure? It seems
like the validation has to occur in the distance measure: d(x,y) = min_Q∈G
max_k || H_k(y) - QH_k(x)Q^-1 ||So we need real world bindings to those
symbols. x,y ∈ people, whatever that means. H_k is the change in the state of
the person after *returning* to a prior context. Let's just allow the state (U)
to be whatever for now, glucose levels, EEG, survey measured Virtue matrix,
whatever. We simply assume it's a high dimensional, dense space. Q is just a
basis change for that space. Yeah, therein lies the assumption that we can
define such a space. But under all the assumptions, it seems like the simplest
operator.All those bindings seem imaginable, to me. The problem I have is the
loop. To what do we bind these "closed loops"? I don't think we can bind them
to things like loop k = 1 = {home, shower, school}, because H_1 may be 0 one
day (on "autopilot") but H_1 >> 1 on another day (you were beaten and had your
lunch money stolen).We might be able say k = 1 = {healthy social support group,
hypercompetitive work colleagues, casually competitive Tennis group}. These
supernodes may make sense. One person's U() may not be impacted by the higher
order effects of competition: U_0→1 = 0. Another may not need social support:
U_2→0 = 0.But if we compare those two people H_1(x) = QH_1(y)Q^-1, where Q
swaps one node for the other. But we would hardly consider those two people to
have equivalent worldviews. Or, going back to the bullying example, if X is
bullied on Tuesday and Y is bullied on Wednesday is H_1(x) = QH_1(y)Q^-1 on
Thursday? Or maybe it takes some time? Maybe H_1(x) = QH_1(y)Q^-1 a week or so
later after the initial shock wears off? Or maybe if you shift Y's worldview by
one autopilot day, *then* it's equivalent to X's?I guess my point is that for
us to know whether the structure of the formalism matches, in any way at all,
the structure of the system being modeled, we need a whole "modeling relation".
Encode the natural system into the formalism. Decode the formalism into the
natural system. A "data first" approach defines the [en|de]coding, then
searches for inferential structures on either side. I'm OK with your formalism
first approach as long as you commit to the followup of searching for
[en|de]codings. Don't bail halfway through and call it "done". 8^DOn 10/5/26
2:28 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:> Good question. Yes, without experimental
confirmation it is just fancy mathematics. The model used for the proofs is an
abstract model. It describes how mindsets/worldviews of adaptive agents diverge
and converge.> > In a simple toy model it works like this:> > > A
context/nodecan be: the places the agent moves through like home, school, work,
street.> > > An edge means stepping from one context to another: home-street,
home-work, ....> > > Moving along the edges changes the internal valuation
matrix of the agent. Every time an agent moves along an edge, their internal
valuation frame gets rotated or updated by an edge matrix. The experience of
making that specific transition reshapes how they evaluate things.> > > If we
reach the same context again we get a loop. A holonomy H measures how a
valuation changes after a loop of contexts. It is the total, combined shift in
the agent's worldview after completing that full loop.> > > A "breaking bad"
model of two agents would include two agents who start with slightly similar
worldviews. One interacts with a group that thinks breaking the rules is bad,
and the other joins a group that believes breaking the rules is necessary to
survive because the world is cruel or rules have been imposed by bad people.> >
> A more complex model would be cultural dissemination. As you know Robert
Axelrod created an agent-based model of cultural dissemination based on local
convergence global polarization. It would be interesting to combine his model
with the new gauge theory model.> > > Other areas of experimental verification
would be> > + Group psychology and organizational psychology (group formation
and fragmentation, group influence in individual)> > + Political science
(emergence of new movements, radicalization pathways, the threshold of schisms,
etc)> > + Sociology (what holds societies together, and what is the role of
socialization and institutions in maintaining social cohesion, to what extent
is the individual shaped by society)> > > -J.> > > > -------- Original message
--------> From: glen <[email protected]>> Date: 10/5/26 8:00 PM (GMT+01:00)>
To: [email protected]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A field theory of understanding> >
I haven't finished reading Jochen's theorems yet. But it seems obvious to me
that he's not claiming experiences are private so much as they are unique. It
seems more about irreversibility or unreachability than closedness.> > And I'm
no expert on Wittgenstein, but my own perspective has been that his dictum was
more about coherent form as opposed to ontology. I.e. if your
language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless for talking
about that target. It's similar to Rosen's argument that predicativity is
inadequate for describing complex systems. Maybe some of us just toss up our
hands and give up when our language seems inadequate. But others of us develop
new language. And still others push the current language as far as it can
possibly be pushed until we're convinced of its [in]adequacy.> > But back to
the first theorem. This seems much closer to a theory (by which I mean a body
of assertions falsifiable through measurement). But what still seems missing
are the bindings. We don't need bindings for *every* symbol in the math. Some
symbols can be internal. (What that _means_ is debatable.) The "numerical"
sections for both give a good indication of what we have to bind. Theorem 1
uses {x,y,z,roll,pitch,yaw,t}. Theorem 2 doesn't seem to have a clear binding
point. Maybe I just missed it. So we can stick to T1.> > I find the binding
mysterious. I have no idea what the points in the space might be. It seems to
rely on the word "concept", as in "returning to the same baseline situation or
concept". But that seems like assuming the consequent to assume something like
a concept, then prove something about independent loops returning to it. So
that can't be the binding point. Maybe H_x is the binding point, some kind of
Δconcept. That's easier to bind because we *can* measure the changes in the
brain/CNS before an after an experience (e.g. showing you a picture while
you're in the MRI machine).> > So my question is: Which of these symbols are
bound to measurements we can (or may one day) be able to make? Without that
binding, all this math is merely decorative, great for hypnotizing your
math-envious friends but useless for science.> > On 10/4/26 7:40 AM, Eric
Charles wrote:> > As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book
(the one I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation in
Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated drafts to some
readers... so if any of you are interested....> >> > This appears in the
epilogue and speaks directly to the question here:> >> > Wittgenstein laid
down a gauntlet to 21^st century philosophers, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann,
darüber muss man schweigen,” which is often translated to, “About what one can
not speak, one must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate
that we should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding the
mind, under the assumption that /all/ such talk is a prime example of
that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. /If/ mind-body dualism is true, either in its
classical form or its modern neural form, then your “feeling of anger” or
“experience of blue” is something that exists only in your mental space, that
only you could access, and my “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is
something that exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And
/if/ that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such things all we
want, but ultimately it is /impossible/ for us to talk about them sensibly.
Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments> > demonstrated this repeatedly.
Understood in this fashion — understood in combination with a /separate/
commitment to dualism — many people have understood Wittgenstein to be one more
philosopher offering proof that a science of psychology is impossible.> >> >
However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we do not see his
dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we understand his dictum as
pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of psychology: Those interested in
psychology must /decide/ whether the phenomena they are discussing are,
inherently, an example of that-of-which-we-/cannot/-speak, or if the phenomena
they are discussing might very well be the types of thing we /can/ speak about
sensibly.> >> > We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of
person deeply interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the
scrutinizing you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that
cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to deal with the
inevitable sadness and disappointment of that situation, and then you should
try to find other things to be interested in. We, however, prefer the other
option. We believe psychological phenomena are the types of things that /can/
be talked about sensibly, and we have endeavored to show that such a position
can work, in practice. We believe there is nothing within our attempt to
understand psychological terms that is fundamentally different than Lavoisier’s
attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be right or wrong
about particular details, but only in the types of ways that can be readily
corrected over time… because the things we are talking about can be
investigated readily,> > with no magic or vital essence, or other mystical
factors having been included.> >> > We believe that psychological phenomena
are the types of things that /can/evolve, that /can/develop, and that /can/be
studied. They are aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be
recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately and explained
well.> >> >> >> > Best,> > Eric> >> >> >
<mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:> >> > If this is
a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the rest. What Wittgenstein
wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent" is
apparently that things like anxiety, pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning
of life, subjective experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and
cannot be meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I see it
differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never understand it. I
prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the depressive pessimism of
Wittgenstein. Popper argued that substantial, real-world problems exist in
philosophy, not just linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims.> >> > For
me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the interesting ones. We
just need to find the right languages, theories, perspectives or metaphors. One
useful metaphor for pain is as you said "an emergency organization of behavior
in which the agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". If
we describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal by
definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to feel pain in
general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for instance we can understand
what it is like to lose a loved dog because most of us have experienced such a
loss of a cat or dog or hamster or horse ourselves ( by the way we have a new
horse now named Mack which looks like this
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg
<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg> ).> >> > This is in my
opinion the solution to the hard problem: the film maker turns a 1st-person
view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema conveys the 3rd-person view to the
persons in the audience, and they are able to understand roughly
what-it-is-like-to-be the lead actor because they see and hear what it goes
through and they know what it feels like to experience pain, loss, and
suffering. According to Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist
("one must remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know
what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the hard problem.>
>> > -J.> >> > On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote:> >
> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of pain. And> >
> …> > >> > > Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man
schweigen> > >> > > You just cannot have it both ways.> > >>
> > N> > >> > > Sent from my Dumb Phone> > >> > >
On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
wrote:> > >> > > Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs
that Gemini created.> > > And Jon also mentioned that they are not
waterproof. So I asked Claude> > > and Gemini if they could write a new
proof. They could. I asked them> > > if we could use gauge theory to
explain subjective experience - gauge> > > invariance to describe
objectivity, and symmetry breaking for> > > subjectivity. Both Claude and
Gemini said yes, and Claude was able to> > > formulate a proof that both
could agree on (combining two AIs which> > > have different personalities
often gives better results than just> > > using one). Gemini is curious
and creative, Claude is accurate and> > > precise. The result was a proof
for a theorem of a new "field theory> > > of understanding". I understand
only half of the mathematics, but the> > > physicist who use gauge theory
for quantum field theories also> > > understand only half of it.> >
>> > > I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named the
same,> > > only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing
than the> > > old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the
appendix with> > > this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard
problem looks> > > similar to this - in combination with the other things
written in the> > > rest of the book.> > >
https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf
<https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf>> > >>
> > Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some> >
> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for example wrote> >
> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as regulations. In a> >
> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my> > >
behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various> > >
sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, has> > > been
fully answered when you have said where X-like people can be> > > found
and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is a kind> > > of
doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of it but> > >
for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what it> > >
feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it does not> > >
scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the animal well> >
> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for example by> >
> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain just as> > >
intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th> > > eir behavior
alone. If it would be better visible, would we still eat> > > pigs and
cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We Love Dogs,> > > Eat
Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?> > >> > > -J.> > >--
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