I haven't finished reading Jochen's theorems yet. But it seems obvious to me
that he's not claiming experiences are private so much as they are unique. It
seems more about irreversibility or unreachability than closedness.
And I'm no expert on Wittgenstein, but my own perspective has been that his
dictum was more about coherent form as opposed to ontology. I.e. if your
language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless for talking
about that target. It's similar to Rosen's argument that predicativity is
inadequate for describing complex systems. Maybe some of us just toss up our
hands and give up when our language seems inadequate. But others of us develop
new language. And still others push the current language as far as it can
possibly be pushed until we're convinced of its [in]adequacy.
But back to the first theorem. This seems much closer to a theory (by which I mean a body
of assertions falsifiable through measurement). But what still seems missing are the
bindings. We don't need bindings for *every* symbol in the math. Some symbols can be
internal. (What that _means_ is debatable.) The "numerical" sections for both
give a good indication of what we have to bind. Theorem 1 uses {x,y,z,roll,pitch,yaw,t}.
Theorem 2 doesn't seem to have a clear binding point. Maybe I just missed it. So we can
stick to T1.
I find the binding mysterious. I have no idea what the points in the space might be. It seems to
rely on the word "concept", as in "returning to the same baseline situation or
concept". But that seems like assuming the consequent to assume something like a concept, then
prove something about independent loops returning to it. So that can't be the binding point. Maybe
H_x is the binding point, some kind of Δconcept. That's easier to bind because we *can* measure the
changes in the brain/CNS before an after an experience (e.g. showing you a picture while you're in
the MRI machine).
So my question is: Which of these symbols are bound to measurements we can (or
may one day) be able to make? Without that binding, all this math is merely
decorative, great for hypnotizing your math-envious friends but useless for
science.
On 10/4/26 7:40 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book (the one I have
been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation in Nick's writing, but
extended beyond that). I have circulated drafts to some readers... so if any of
you are interested....
This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question here:
Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21^st century philosophers, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen,” which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, one must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate that we should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding the mind, under the assumption that /all/ such talk is a prime example of that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. /If/ mind-body dualism is true, either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then your “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, and my “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And /if/ that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such things all we want, but ultimately it is /impossible/ for us to talk about them sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments
demonstrated this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in combination with a /separate/ commitment to dualism — many people have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering proof that a science of psychology is impossible.
However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we do not see his
dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we understand his dictum as
pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of psychology: Those interested in
psychology must /decide/ whether the phenomena they are discussing are,
inherently, an example of that-of-which-we-/cannot/-speak, or if the phenomena
they are discussing might very well be the types of thing we /can/ speak about
sensibly.
We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person deeply interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the scrutinizing you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to deal with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that situation, and then you should try to find other things to be interested in. We, however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological phenomena are the types of things that /can/ be talked about sensibly, and we have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in practice. We believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand psychological terms that is fundamentally different than Lavoisier’s attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be right or wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways that can be readily corrected over time… because the things we are talking about can be investigated readily,
with no magic or vital essence, or other mystical factors having been included.
We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things that
/can/evolve, that /can/develop, and that /can/be studied. They are aspects of
behavioral design. And that design deserves to be recognized and accounted for,
to be both described accurately and explained well.
Best,
Eric
<mailto:[email protected]>
On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the rest. What Wittgenstein
wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent" is
apparently that things like anxiety, pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life,
subjective experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot be
meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I see it differently. The
problem is if we remain silent we will never understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's
optimistic view to the depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that
substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just linguistic puzzles as
Wittgenstein claims.
For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the interesting ones. We just need to find the
right languages, theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for pain is as you said "an
emergency organization of behavior in which the agent deploys physical and social defenses of various
sorts". If we describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal by definition. And yet we
all can understand what it is like to feel pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me"
for instance we can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most of us have experienced such a
loss of a cat or dog or hamster or horse ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which
looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg>
).
This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the film maker turns a
1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema conveys the 3rd-person view to the
persons in the audience, and they are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be
the lead actor because they see and hear what it goes through and they know what it feels
like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According to Wittgenstein cinemas should
not be allowed to exist ("one must remain silent"). But people like them
because they want to know what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the
hard problem.
-J.
On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of pain. And
> …
>
> Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen
>
> You just cannot have it both ways.
>
> N
>
> Sent from my Dumb Phone
>
> On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini created.
> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I asked Claude
> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I asked them
> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience - gauge
> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for
> subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was able to
> formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs which
> have different personalities often gives better results than just
> using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate and
> precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field theory
> of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics, but the
> physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also
> understand only half of it.
>
> I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named the same,
> only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing than the
> old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the appendix with
> this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem looks
> similar to this - in combination with the other things written in the
> rest of the book.
> https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf
<https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf>
>
> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some
> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for example wrote
> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as regulations. In a
> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my
> behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various
> sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, has
> been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can be
> found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is a kind
> of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of it but
> for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what it
> feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it does not
> scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the animal well
> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for example by
> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain just as
> intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th
> eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we still eat
> pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We Love Dogs,
> Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?
>
> -J.
>
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