responding to two of glen's comments:

First the two anecdotes about dropping/catching things. My experience as I read 
them, there are two different conscious entities here, glen and glen's body.  
[Hidden premise in the movie, Jennifer's Body?] made me think, another 
experience, of the metaphor "monkey brain riding a dogs brain riding a lizards 
brain," and made me wonder, another experience, if all three have 
quasi-independent consciousnesses.

Second, the fusion anecdotes. I experienced a "yes!" moment regarding a 
continuum of consciousness: "mom's ICU partial fusion, mom's "fully home" 
fusion, and Huxley's Doors of Perception fusion, escaping the filters imposed 
by the 'focused-on-survival-brain' and achieving a (more) complete fusion.

davew


On Thu, Jul 25, 2024, at 8:29 AM, glen wrote:
> I disagree the theme is "pausing between two possibilities". I view the 
> theme as a *fusion* of sensory input. Sometimes, the sensory fusion 
> appears to be intentionally stanced as a choice/decision. But that's 
> not the case in the itch transfer, hat-catching, or satiety examples. 
> Those are clearly examples of the fusion of high dimensional 
> environmental data.
>
> Consciousness is that *fusion*. Another example is when someone wakes 
> up from anesthesia, when you "see" that "someone is home". They've 
> become conscious. They're now taking in a bunch of data from the 
> environment and fusing it, making sense of it. I have a story akin to 
> that, too. Before my mom got her pacemaker put in, she'd been in the 
> ICU for a few days and had ICU delirium. She played cards with illusory 
> people, kept telling me there was a man behind me, asking me what the 
> man was doing there, etc. This is a kind of consciousness, but an 
> incomplete kind. When she would "wake up" from that delirium, you could 
> see that she was now fully "home", conscious, competently fusing the 
> incoming data.
>
>
> On 7/24/24 18:46, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>> a  theme that seems  to run through these examples is that the animal pauses 
>> between two possibilities.  we are tempted to understand these behaviors in 
>> terms of  the consideration of alternatives,  ...[snip]... just as you cat 
>> instead of doing either of the two things you might expect,  hovers between 
>> the  two, making what the ethologists would call "intention movements" in 
>> either direction as the pressure leaks out.
>> 
>> But what calls for an explanation in both cases is the violation of the 
>> observer's expectations.
>
>
> -- 
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>
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