> On 1 Jul 2019, at 09:45, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, June 30, 2019 at 1:13:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 28 Jun 2019, at 16:52, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> If an ARM processor running any ARM code [ http://www.toves.org/books/arm/ >> <http://www.toves.org/books/arm/> ] program is ever conscious, or a computer >> consisting of 10^10 ARM processors running multiprocessor ARM code is ever >> conscious them the "computationalist theory of mind" holds. If not, it >> doesn’t. > > The point is that elementary arithmetic run, out of tie and space, in the > precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely often with a > precise mathematical redundancy, and once you agree that such 10^100 ARM > processor are conscious, they get the same problem as us, which computations > run them. By reasoning they know that below their substitution level there > should be a complex statistics on *all* computations, and above, there are > the laws of physics and finitely many universal neighbours. > > Keep in mind that all universal system can imitate all other universal > system. That play a role in metaphysics, not in applications. > > I read a summary of a paper justifying the (rather complex and mysterious) > kinetic of enzymes by the fact that some could exploits some quantum > computation. That could lower down the substitution level a lot and 10^10 ARM > might not been enough, if the substitution level is at the biochemical level. > But again, the weak Mechanist assumption I work with is that it exists such a > level (being totally neutral on it in particular). > > Bruno > > > I think I meant 10^100 (vs. 10^10 I wrote, or rather size - in this case - > doesn't matter). And the ARMs could be replaced by QuARMs (ARMs w/qubits). It > still would not have the experientiality of biocomputers. > > But the idea of computing as elementary arithmetic run, out of time and > space, in the precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely > often with a precise mathematical redundancy is certainly a 'Platonic' or > immaterially pure idea of computing (and of course I call it 'fictional', but > that's OK).
OK. Computation is a mathematical notion. > But following Donald Rumsfeld, you compute with the computers you have (the > stuff engineers can use to make ''computers' - of whatever materials, > including biomaterials), not with the computers you don't have (Platonic > arithmetic). Thanks God, there is still no patent for using the numbers, and you don’t have to pay taxes when using the model opens rule. So, no need to invoke a “physical-ontological universe” to explain why a machine needs a concrete computer, relatively to itself to make a concrete computation relatively to some other universal numbers, be it a colleague, a friend, a teacher, … The goal here is not to sell computers. But to understand where the illusion of physical computers comes from, and why that illusion is persistent. We believe already, by computer science and Mechanism, that such illusion exist, are lawful, and gives rise to physical realities, and this in a way precise enough to be tested experimentally, and Quantum Mechanics does confirms the main features made obligatory from Mechanism. That does not make biocomputing, and unconventional programming less interesting, but it found them on rigorous, and rather simple (conceptually) base. Bruno > > > @philipthrift > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/38877786-b8bd-4f71-adf1-f1d70249bbfe%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/38877786-b8bd-4f71-adf1-f1d70249bbfe%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/46E203A2-4FA4-4EE3-9CFF-0681033D80AC%40ulb.ac.be.
