> On 26 Jun 2019, at 16:23, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> The universal machine provides an account of its >>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to >>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). >>> >>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very >>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even >>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. >>> >>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as >>> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. >>> >>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the >>> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. >>> >>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively >>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they >>> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that >>> they aren’t. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as >>> we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we >>> think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties >>> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, >>> selfness, …). >> >> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not assume >> the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge .. have >> to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it). >> >> >>> >>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - as >>> being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint. >> >> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to >> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the >> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further >> assumption). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> In the end I can see number crunching - of numbers of whatever level or >> "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) at best of what >> there is in reality - which is called matter. > > I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the > digitalist doctor. > > I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by > “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying yes > to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it is > argued, less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, making > the digital mechanist hypothesis testable. > > Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist > hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my > work, of course). > > Bruno > > > > > > matter = material substratum > > The existence of a material substratum was posited by John Locke > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke>,
I would have said that Aristotle, and perhaps the ancient atomist did come up with this before. > with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza>'s substance I tend to agree with you, but among my students this year I have a philosopher who like very much Spinoza, and he criticises a lot that interpretation of Spinoza. Now, he considers only Spinoza treatise “the Ethic”, and dismiss most of his other writing. I find Spinoza not enough clear on this. > and Immanuel Kant <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant>'s concept of > the noumenon <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon> (in The Critique of > Pure Reason <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Critique_of_Pure_Reason>). Again, I agree with you, but hereto Kant is unclear, and different readers have different opinion on this. > > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon> Substance is the latine for the greek Hypostasis. The word “substance" in philosophy is sometimes used for Aristotle’s primary matter, which is at the antipode of the use of “hypostasis” by the neoplatonist, where the hypostases are more like fundamental modes of view. The "material hypostases” (sensible and intelligible matter) are more close to the modern idea of “invariant” in physics than of a material substance that things should be made-of. I don’t assume that type of thing. Like God, it is too much unclear to be assumed in a fundamental theory, I think. With the computationalist theory of mind, it does not make sense at all. Now, a departure between G* “theory of matter” and observation would be an evidence against computationalism, and so, indirectly, perhaps, an evidence for some substance, but even this is not so obvious. If Mechanism is false, we might need some infinities having a rôle in consciousness, but the notion of ontological substance remains unclear. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/95109754-df4c-4758-a412-087ab0284314%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/95109754-df4c-4758-a412-087ab0284314%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E9D0EB59-D07B-416E-A87E-8F4CA655EE3C%40ulb.ac.be.
