> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> The universal machine provides an account of its >> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to >> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). >> >> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very >> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even >> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. >> >> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as >> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. >> >> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the >> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. >> >> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively recently, >> 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they are docile >> slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that they aren’t. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as >> we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we >> think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties (qualia, >> phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, selfness, …). > > Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not assume > the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge .. have to > be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it). > > >> >> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - as >> being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint. > > That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to distinguish > “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the modal > provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further assumption). > > Bruno > > > > > In the end I can see number crunching - of numbers of whatever level or > "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) at best of what > there is in reality - which is called matter.
I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the digitalist doctor. I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it is argued, less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable. Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my work, of course). Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7d6922db-dfca-4bad-88f8-5d8df790eafb%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7d6922db-dfca-4bad-88f8-5d8df790eafb%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/51BE3937-FCEC-42AB-99BF-9611AEBB23B1%40ulb.ac.be.
