> On 28 Jun 2019, at 16:52, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, June 28, 2019 at 4:58:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 Jun 2019, at 16:23, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> The universal machine provides an account of its >>>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to >>>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). >>>> >>>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very >>>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even >>>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. >>>> >>>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as >>>> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. >>>> >>>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the >>>> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. >>>> >>>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively >>>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that >>>> they are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us >>>> that they aren’t. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just >>>> as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) >>>> we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties >>>> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, >>>> selfness, …). >>> >>> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not >>> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge >>> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it). >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - >>>> as being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint. >>> >>> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to >>> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the >>> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further >>> assumption). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> In the end I can see number crunching - of numbers of whatever level or >>> "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) at best of what >>> there is in reality - which is called matter. >> >> I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the >> digitalist doctor. >> >> I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by >> “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying >> yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it >> is argued, less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, >> making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable. >> >> Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist >> hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my >> work, of course). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> matter = material substratum >> >> The existence of a material substratum was posited by John Locke >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke>, > > I would have said that Aristotle, and perhaps the ancient atomist did come up > with this before. > > > >> with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza>'s substance > > > I tend to agree with you, but among my students this year I have a > philosopher who like very much Spinoza, and he criticises a lot that > interpretation of Spinoza. Now, he considers only Spinoza treatise “the > Ethic”, and dismiss most of his other writing. I find Spinoza not enough > clear on this. > > > > >> and Immanuel Kant <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant>'s concept of >> the noumenon <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon> (in The Critique of >> Pure Reason <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Critique_of_Pure_Reason>). > > Again, I agree with you, but hereto Kant is unclear, and different readers > have different opinion on this. > > > >> >> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon> > > Substance is the latine for the greek Hypostasis. The word “substance" in > philosophy is sometimes used for Aristotle’s primary matter, which is at the > antipode of the use of “hypostasis” by the neoplatonist, where the hypostases > are more like fundamental modes of view. > > The "material hypostases” (sensible and intelligible matter) are more close > to the modern idea of “invariant” in physics than of a material substance > that things should be made-of. > I don’t assume that type of thing. Like God, it is too much unclear to be > assumed in a fundamental theory, I think. > > With the computationalist theory of mind, it does not make sense at all. Now, > a departure between G* “theory of matter” and observation would be an > evidence against computationalism, and so, indirectly, perhaps, an evidence > for some substance, but even this is not so obvious. If Mechanism is false, > we might need some infinities having a rôle in consciousness, but the notion > of ontological substance remains unclear. > > Bruno > > > > > > If an ARM processor running any ARM code [ http://www.toves.org/books/arm/ > <http://www.toves.org/books/arm/> ] program is ever conscious, or a computer > consisting of 10^10 ARM processors running multiprocessor ARM code is ever > conscious them the "computationalist theory of mind" holds. If not, it > doesn’t.
The point is that elementary arithmetic run, out of tie and space, in the precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely often with a precise mathematical redundancy, and once you agree that such 10^100 ARM processor are conscious, they get the same problem as us, which computations run them. By reasoning they know that below their substitution level there should be a complex statistics on *all* computations, and above, there are the laws of physics and finitely many universal neighbours. Keep in mind that all universal system can imitate all other universal system. That play a role in metaphysics, not in applications. I read a summary of a paper justifying the (rather complex and mysterious) kinetic of enzymes by the fact that some could exploits some quantum computation. That could lower down the substitution level a lot and 10^10 ARM might not been enough, if the substitution level is at the biochemical level. But again, the weak Mechanist assumption I work with is that it exists such a level (being totally neutral on it in particular). Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/645485fa-7161-4961-86f6-b82cca4a08da%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/645485fa-7161-4961-86f6-b82cca4a08da%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/774B3C5B-58F0-4A66-B0DC-2EE9D76C5121%40ulb.ac.be.
