I also ask the same question and look for solutions. I do find a statement from a paper (The Honey Badger of BFT Protocols@ CCS 2016) that " if an trusted party is unavailable, then a distributed key generation protocol could be used instead (c.f., Boldyreva [11])."
[11] A. Boldyreva. Threshold signatures, multisignatures and blind signatures based on the gap-diffie-hellman-group signature scheme. In Public key cryptographyâA˘TPKC 2003 ˇ , pages 31–46. Springer, 2002 I have no experience on Boldyreva protocol though, but it seems possible without a central service if all participants follow a certain common rule or algorithm. Davey > -----邮件原件----- > 发件人: DNSOP [mailto:dnsop-boun...@ietf.org] 代表 Hugo Salgado-Herná > ndez > 发送时间: 2018年9月7日 3:22 > 收件人: Steve Crocker > 抄送: dnsop; Mukund Sivaraman; dns-operati...@dns-oarc.net > 主题: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea > > On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote: > > How do you prevent compromise of the central service? > > > > For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary, to check there's no > extra > subkeys and for secure transmision of them. But afterwards there's no need. > Each node can check the final signature validates with the public key (just > like a > normal signature), and the plain data should be public (DNSKEY rrset). > > In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric keys for the secure > transmission of data and signature pieces. > > The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail and the signing > process can be completed, and you can detect faked sub-signatures. > > Hugo > > > Steve > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández > > <hsalg...@nic.cl> > > wrote: > > > > > On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández > wrote: > > > > > Hi Mukund. > > > > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an > > > > > implementation in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and > ICANN[3]. > > > > > > > > Aha so you're the original source :) > > > > > > > > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but > > > > > certainly in labs and testing. There's been some interests with > > > > > academic institutions, but don't think they're ready yet. > > > > > > > > > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, > > > > > as having similar security features without buying an expensive HW. > > > > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit > > > > > for having an split of the private key AND the fact of not > > > > > needing a "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign > > > > > remotely with each piece of the private key, and transmit the > > > > > "signature > pieces" > > > > > to a central place. > > > > > > > > > > Hugo > > > > > > > > > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm > > > > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId= > > > 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20> > > > > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/ > > > presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en> > > > > > > > > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my > > > > mind I was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen + > > > > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR > > > > type + zone transfers to share intermediate effects. > > > > > > In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who > > > creates the first key and split the private pieces to each signing > > > node. This same orchestrator later send signature requests to each > > > node, collect the signature pieces and defines the "consensus" of > > > M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11 interface between this orchestrator > > > and the zone signing policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup). > > > > > > Hugo > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > DNSOP mailing list > > > DNSOP@ietf.org > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > DNSOP mailing list > > DNSOP@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
