My focus is on preventing the orchestrator from faking the signatures. Steve
Sent from my iPhone > On Sep 6, 2018, at 3:52 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalg...@nic.cl> wrote: > >> On 15:25 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote: >> Let me flag a key point. You said this scheme will *detect* faked >> signatures. If you want to *prevent* faked signatures, you need additional >> structure. > > The orchestrator can detect faked signature pieces when is > merging them, before going live. So for this definition of > "prevent" should be sufficient. If you're referring to > prevent the orchestrator with faking the resulting signature, > I think we're gonna fail preventing but only reacting after > detecting it alive. > > Hugo > >> >> Steve >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalg...@nic.cl> >> wrote: >> >>>> On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote: >>>> How do you prevent compromise of the central service? >>>> >>> >>> For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary, >>> to check there's no extra subkeys and for secure transmision >>> of them. But afterwards there's no need. Each node can check >>> the final signature validates with the public key (just like >>> a normal signature), and the plain data should be public >>> (DNSKEY rrset). >>> >>> In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric >>> keys for the secure transmission of data and signature >>> pieces. >>> >>> The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail >>> and the signing process can be completed, and you can >>> detect faked sub-signatures. >>> >>> Hugo >>> >>>> Steve >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalg...@nic.cl> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: >>>>>> On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández >>> wrote: >>>>>>> Hi Mukund. >>>>>>> I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation >>>>>>> in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3]. >>>>>> >>>>>> Aha so you're the original source :) >>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but >>> certainly >>>>>>> in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic >>>>>>> institutions, but don't think they're ready yet. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as >>>>>>> having similar security features without buying an expensive HW. >>>>>>> But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for >>>>>>> having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a >>>>>>> "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with >>>>>>> each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces" >>>>>>> to a central place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hugo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm >>>>>>> [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId= >>>>> 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20> >>>>>>> [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/ >>>>> presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en> >>>>>> >>>>>> So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my >>> mind I >>>>>> was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen + >>>>>> dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR >>> type + >>>>>> zone transfers to share intermediate effects. >>>>> >>>>> In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who >>>>> creates the first key and split the private pieces to each >>>>> signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature >>>>> requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and >>>>> defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11 >>>>> interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing >>>>> policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup). >>>>> >>>>> Hugo >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> DNSOP mailing list >>>>> DNSOP@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> DNSOP mailing list >>>> DNSOP@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop >>> >>> > >> _______________________________________________ >> DNSOP mailing list >> DNSOP@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop > _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
