How do you prevent compromise of the central service? Steve
On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalg...@nic.cl> wrote: > On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández wrote: > > > Hi Mukund. > > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation > > > in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3]. > > > > Aha so you're the original source :) > > > > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but certainly > > > in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic > > > institutions, but don't think they're ready yet. > > > > > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as > > > having similar security features without buying an expensive HW. > > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for > > > having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a > > > "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with > > > each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces" > > > to a central place. > > > > > > Hugo > > > > > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm > > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId= > 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20> > > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/ > presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en> > > > > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my mind I > > was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen + > > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR type + > > zone transfers to share intermediate effects. > > In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who > creates the first key and split the private pieces to each > signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature > requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and > defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11 > interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing > policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup). > > Hugo > > > _______________________________________________ > DNSOP mailing list > DNSOP@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop > >
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