Let me flag a key point. You said this scheme will *detect* faked signatures. If you want to *prevent* faked signatures, you need additional structure.
Steve On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalg...@nic.cl> wrote: > On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote: > > How do you prevent compromise of the central service? > > > > For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary, > to check there's no extra subkeys and for secure transmision > of them. But afterwards there's no need. Each node can check > the final signature validates with the public key (just like > a normal signature), and the plain data should be public > (DNSKEY rrset). > > In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric > keys for the secure transmission of data and signature > pieces. > > The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail > and the signing process can be completed, and you can > detect faked sub-signatures. > > Hugo > > > Steve > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalg...@nic.cl> > > wrote: > > > > > On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández > wrote: > > > > > Hi Mukund. > > > > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation > > > > > in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3]. > > > > > > > > Aha so you're the original source :) > > > > > > > > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but > certainly > > > > > in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic > > > > > institutions, but don't think they're ready yet. > > > > > > > > > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as > > > > > having similar security features without buying an expensive HW. > > > > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for > > > > > having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a > > > > > "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with > > > > > each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces" > > > > > to a central place. > > > > > > > > > > Hugo > > > > > > > > > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm > > > > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId= > > > 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20> > > > > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/ > > > presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en> > > > > > > > > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my > mind I > > > > was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen + > > > > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR > type + > > > > zone transfers to share intermediate effects. > > > > > > In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who > > > creates the first key and split the private pieces to each > > > signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature > > > requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and > > > defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11 > > > interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing > > > policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup). > > > > > > Hugo > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > DNSOP mailing list > > > DNSOP@ietf.org > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > DNSOP mailing list > > DNSOP@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop > >
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