Hi Mukund. I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3].
I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but certainly in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic institutions, but don't think they're ready yet. We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as having similar security features without buying an expensive HW. But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces" to a central place. Hugo [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20> [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en> On 21:42 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: > During a coversation about the Yeti project, Davey Song brought up an > idea about using threshold signatures within DNSSEC. While he talked > about it primarily for the root zone within the context of having > multiple signers for it, I'm curious to know what operators think about > the concept for other zones, and if there's any interest in having a > working implementation. > > DNSKEY RRs contain public keys. Corresponding secret keys are managed by > signing entities in various ways: > > * It may be for a low-risk zone and a human may leave the key on the > nameserver itself > > * The key may be held by some number of trustworthy staff offline and > when signing is required, one of them signs the zone and returns the > signed zone > > * It may be managed by an automated system under the control of one or > more people > > * It may be held in a locked computer system which may be accessed when > multiple trustworthy "keepers" are present > > * There may be schemes like this: > https://www.icann.org/news/blog/the-problem-with-the-seven-keys > > In many of these cases, it may be possible for one rogue person to sign > records against the wish of the rest of the trustworthy group appointed > by a zone owner. Even though it's unlikely, it's possible to do so > because the control over secret key material may be available to one > person, even if it is wrapped in multiple layers. > > The concept of threshold crypto is that there is a public DNSKEY, for > which the secret key is not available in a single form where it can be > reconstructed. Instead, N members of a group have some key material each > respectively, and any M (< N) members of the group may work together to > prepare RRSIGs by using their respective key materials individually, and > collaborating to generate the signatures. > > It may be possible for such a scheme to be compatible with existing > DNSSEC algorithms. Is there any operator interest in this? > > Mukund > > _______________________________________________ > DNSOP mailing list > DNSOP@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop >
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