On Sep 14, 2017 7:44 PM, "Kerim Aydin" <ke...@u.washington.edu> wrote:
> >> CFJ 2120 states (apparently in accordance with previous precedent
which I
> >> couldn't find) that, where there is a SHALL without any reasonable
mechanism to
> >> fulfill it, it implies CAN by announcement.
Unfortunately, CFJ 2120 gets precedent wrong, and this concerns me.
CFJ 2120 says "SHALL implies CAN by announcement, based on the precedent in
CFJ 1765".
But a look at CFJ 1765 shows the arguments are:
I believe that the obligation to perform an action in conjunction with
the phrase "by announcement", as used in the last paragraph of
R1871/18,
implies a mechanism for the action
In other words, the chain of precedents that we're relying on actually
starts
with: SHALL by announcement implies CAN by announcement.
This isn't so much of a stretch!
So I'm worried that the missing "by announcement" is never addressed with
any reason
and based on faulty precedent...
It would be great to be clear and set a precedent, if "by announcement" (or
other
method like w/o objection) isn't specified, when can we infer "by
announcement"?
I mean, why doesn't it imply w/o objection instead, just as an example. If
SHALL
works, does it work for MAY? Lower case directives? Etc.
I find this pretty compelling but I have no skin in the game (and am a fan
of pragmatism generally).
I would support a motion to reconsider if others find this argument
compelling enough and provided additional arguments/evidence about the
gamestate, but I'm not going to initiate one.
-grok
