> On Sep 13, 2017, at 7:55 PM, Aris Merchant 
> <thoughtsoflifeandligh...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Judge's Arguments for CFJ 3557:
> 
> This case boils down an interpretation of the application of Rule 2152
> ("Mother, May I?") to Rule 2497 ("Floating Value"). The full text of both
> rules is in the evidence below. To summarize the situation, the main questions
> of the case are:
> 
>  1. Can the Secretary ever set the floating value?
>  2. Can the Secretary set the floating value incorrectly?
> 
> 
> The problem is that the rule never directly allows the Secretary to set the
> floating value. Instead, it provides that "[...] the Secretary SHALL flip the
> Floating Value to Agora's shiny balance." There are several interesting
> precedents about whether SHALL implies CAN, all arising from cases called by 
> G.
> CFJ 2120 states (apparently in accordance with previous precedent which I
> couldn't find) that, where there is a SHALL without any reasonable mechanism 
> to
> fulfill it, it implies CAN by announcement. This resolves question 1 in the
> affirmative. The same case also ruled that where time limits are specified, 
> they
> apply to the SHALL, but not the CAN. This arrangement was specified to
> cause the deputization rules to continue working, and is affirmed.
> 
> A second precedent comes from CFJ 2412. There, it was ruled that were
> one rule says "SHALL" (but not CAN) and a second rule says "SHALL NOT"
> (but not CANNOT) the implied CAN still works.
> 
> Neither of these cases address required circumstances other than time.
> I think that given that this whole business is based on common law
> interpretation of implications, the primary guideline is to figure out
> what exactly the rule is implying. In cases like this one, where
> the rule is essentially "X SHALL do Y correctly", the correctness
> of the action is essential to its success. If the rule was attempting
> to specify so complex a concept as 'X CAN do Y, and SHALL do so correctly'
> it would have said so. Note that this is completely different from cases
> where the rule specifies when the condition is one of encouragement (such
> as making it mandatory to do Y within a certain time), rather than limitation.
> Question 2 is accordingly answered in the negative. I note that while
> this ruling is clearly against the interests of the game in this specific 
> case,
> it is likely to be helpful in many other cases. I judge this CFJ FALSE.

Just make sure I understand this ruling: can I conclude that the Secretary, 
under the rules as we have them today, CAN flip the Floating Value, but only 
correctly?

That’s hugely helpful, as it turns a number of questions about the validity of 
recent attempts to pend proposals into a single question about Agora’s balance 
at the start of the relevant week.

-o

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