> On Sep 13, 2017, at 7:55 PM, Aris Merchant > <thoughtsoflifeandligh...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Judge's Arguments for CFJ 3557: > > This case boils down an interpretation of the application of Rule 2152 > ("Mother, May I?") to Rule 2497 ("Floating Value"). The full text of both > rules is in the evidence below. To summarize the situation, the main questions > of the case are: > > 1. Can the Secretary ever set the floating value? > 2. Can the Secretary set the floating value incorrectly? > > > The problem is that the rule never directly allows the Secretary to set the > floating value. Instead, it provides that "[...] the Secretary SHALL flip the > Floating Value to Agora's shiny balance." There are several interesting > precedents about whether SHALL implies CAN, all arising from cases called by > G. > CFJ 2120 states (apparently in accordance with previous precedent which I > couldn't find) that, where there is a SHALL without any reasonable mechanism > to > fulfill it, it implies CAN by announcement. This resolves question 1 in the > affirmative. The same case also ruled that where time limits are specified, > they > apply to the SHALL, but not the CAN. This arrangement was specified to > cause the deputization rules to continue working, and is affirmed. > > A second precedent comes from CFJ 2412. There, it was ruled that were > one rule says "SHALL" (but not CAN) and a second rule says "SHALL NOT" > (but not CANNOT) the implied CAN still works. > > Neither of these cases address required circumstances other than time. > I think that given that this whole business is based on common law > interpretation of implications, the primary guideline is to figure out > what exactly the rule is implying. In cases like this one, where > the rule is essentially "X SHALL do Y correctly", the correctness > of the action is essential to its success. If the rule was attempting > to specify so complex a concept as 'X CAN do Y, and SHALL do so correctly' > it would have said so. Note that this is completely different from cases > where the rule specifies when the condition is one of encouragement (such > as making it mandatory to do Y within a certain time), rather than limitation. > Question 2 is accordingly answered in the negative. I note that while > this ruling is clearly against the interests of the game in this specific > case, > it is likely to be helpful in many other cases. I judge this CFJ FALSE.
Just make sure I understand this ruling: can I conclude that the Secretary, under the rules as we have them today, CAN flip the Floating Value, but only correctly? That’s hugely helpful, as it turns a number of questions about the validity of recent attempts to pend proposals into a single question about Agora’s balance at the start of the relevant week. -o
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