Hi, Yes I too got messages from Cynthia every few hours (wanting to meet) until I blocked the email address.
Thanks On Fri, 31 Aug 2018, 22:52 Matthew Glennon, <matthew@glennon.online> wrote: > Anyone else getting nude photos and random links from Cynthia Coleman < > cynthiacoleman843...@ru.irzum.com> attached to this (and other thread(s) > lately? Spam obviously, but ugh. > > Matthew Glennon > > Want to make sure only I can read your message? Use PGP! > (Then paste the encrypted text into an email for me to receive!) > https://keybase.io/crazysane/ > https://pgp.key-server.io/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x92E43A8A9EF85EB4 > > > On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 5:01 PM Conrad Rockenhaus <con...@rockenhaus.com> > wrote: > >> Good God every conversation, now. Anyway. >> >> This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor >> though, I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known >> as balls to those of you who don’t habla espanol) to operate an exit in >> country such as Turkey, which absolutely hates freedom inducing >> technologies such as Tor. Let’s give this guy (or gal) the atto-boy by >> marking the exit as a bad-exit just because stuff gets blocked in >> autocratic regimes that this operator has no control over. None, absolutely >> none. They screw with the DNS servers over there, that’s why during the >> last uprising they were tagging “8.8.8.8” on the walls. >> >> Now they’re doing things a little more sophisticated. Either way, this >> guy gives us a window to see what is blocked and what isn’t blocked within >> the Turkish thunderdome. >> >> -Conrad >> >> > On Aug 30, 2018, at 9:24 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <m...@lunorian.is> wrote: >> > >> > What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective >> > client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful? >> > >> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <ari...@cni.net> wrote: >> > >> >> Children should be seen and not herd. The opposite goes for Tor >> relays. >> >> Arisbe >> >> >> >> >> >> On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote: >> >> >> >> So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in >> >> Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or >> Syria or >> >> Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they >> >> should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir >> flags >> >> too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor. >> Don't >> >> risk that! >> >> >> >> Cordially, >> >> Nathaniel Suchy >> >> >> >> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >>> This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months... >> >>> D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114 >> >>> >> >>> The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its >> upstream >> >>> is >> >>> shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough. >> >>> And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully >> >>> useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions / >> networks. >> >>> >> >>> Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected >> >>> to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish, >> therefore >> >>> such censorship is moot for them. >> >>> >> >>> For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,, >> >>> https://onion.torproject.org/ >> >>> http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/ >> >>> search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc >> >>> >> >>> Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out >> >>> from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit >> >>> may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true >> >>> representation >> >>> of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator >> action >> >>> even though unintentional / delayed. >> >>> >> >>> Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this, >> >>> so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see... >> >>> https://ooni.torproject.org/ >> >>> >> >>> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country >> >>> >> >>> And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer >> >>> resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes >> >>> around the world. >> >>> >> >>> And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited >> >>> visibility, >> >>> for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either, >> >>> and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed >> >>> exits as well. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM, >> >>> New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes. >> >>> >> >>> They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such >> >>> classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels >> >>> of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others >> >>> can subscribe to them and Exclude at will. >> >>> They can further publish patches to make tor automatically >> >>> read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude >> >>> and route stream requests around just those lists of censored >> >>> destination:exit pairings. >> >>> >> >>> Ref also... >> >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit >> >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact >> >>> the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship. >> >>> >> >>> Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what >> >>> would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream >> >>> to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted... >> >>> >> >>> a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to >> >>> use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your >> >>> blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally >> >>> unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one >> >>> of the others tor has open? >> >>> >> >>> b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net, >> >>> like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit >> >>> or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them? >> >>> >> >>> c) ??? >> >>> >> >>> Or that some large number of topsites were censored via >> >>> singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be >> >>> exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where >> >>> no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance >> >>> is known to exist at the same time. >> >>> _______________________________________________ >> >>> tor-relays mailing list >> >>> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> tor-relays mailing listtor-relays@lists.torproject.orghttps:// >> lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt. >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> tor-relays mailing list >> >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> >> >> > -- >> > tor-talk mailing list - tor-t...@lists.torproject.org >> > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >
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