What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful?
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <ari...@cni.net> wrote: > Children should be seen and not herd. The opposite goes for Tor relays. > Arisbe > > > On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote: > > So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in > Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or Syria or > Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they > should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir flags > too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor. Don't > risk that! > > Cordially, > Nathaniel Suchy > > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months... >> D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114 >> >> The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its upstream >> is >> shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough. >> And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully >> useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions / networks. >> >> Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected >> to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish, therefore >> such censorship is moot for them. >> >> For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,, >> https://onion.torproject.org/ >> http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/ >> search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc >> >> Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out >> from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit >> may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true >> representation >> of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator action >> even though unintentional / delayed. >> >> Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this, >> so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see... >> https://ooni.torproject.org/ >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country >> >> And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer >> resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes >> around the world. >> >> And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited >> visibility, >> for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either, >> and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed >> exits as well. >> >> >> If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM, >> New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes. >> >> They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such >> classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels >> of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others >> can subscribe to them and Exclude at will. >> They can further publish patches to make tor automatically >> read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude >> and route stream requests around just those lists of censored >> destination:exit pairings. >> >> Ref also... >> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit >> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit >> >> >> In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact >> the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship. >> >> Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what >> would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream >> to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted... >> >> a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to >> use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your >> blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally >> unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one >> of the others tor has open? >> >> b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net, >> like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit >> or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them? >> >> c) ??? >> >> Or that some large number of topsites were censored via >> singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be >> exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where >> no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance >> is known to exist at the same time. >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing > listtor-relays@lists.torproject.orghttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > -- > One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt. > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >
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