Anyone else getting nude photos and random links from Cynthia Coleman < cynthiacoleman843...@ru.irzum.com> attached to this (and other thread(s) lately? Spam obviously, but ugh.
Matthew Glennon Want to make sure only I can read your message? Use PGP! (Then paste the encrypted text into an email for me to receive!) https://keybase.io/crazysane/ https://pgp.key-server.io/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x92E43A8A9EF85EB4 On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 5:01 PM Conrad Rockenhaus <con...@rockenhaus.com> wrote: > Good God every conversation, now. Anyway. > > This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor > though, I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known > as balls to those of you who don’t habla espanol) to operate an exit in > country such as Turkey, which absolutely hates freedom inducing > technologies such as Tor. Let’s give this guy (or gal) the atto-boy by > marking the exit as a bad-exit just because stuff gets blocked in > autocratic regimes that this operator has no control over. None, absolutely > none. They screw with the DNS servers over there, that’s why during the > last uprising they were tagging “8.8.8.8” on the walls. > > Now they’re doing things a little more sophisticated. Either way, this guy > gives us a window to see what is blocked and what isn’t blocked within the > Turkish thunderdome. > > -Conrad > > > On Aug 30, 2018, at 9:24 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <m...@lunorian.is> wrote: > > > > What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective > > client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful? > > > > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <ari...@cni.net> wrote: > > > >> Children should be seen and not herd. The opposite goes for Tor relays. > >> Arisbe > >> > >> > >> On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote: > >> > >> So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in > >> Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or > Syria or > >> Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they > >> should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir > flags > >> too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor. > Don't > >> risk that! > >> > >> Cordially, > >> Nathaniel Suchy > >> > >> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >>> This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months... > >>> D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114 > >>> > >>> The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its > upstream > >>> is > >>> shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough. > >>> And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully > >>> useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions / networks. > >>> > >>> Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected > >>> to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish, therefore > >>> such censorship is moot for them. > >>> > >>> For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,, > >>> https://onion.torproject.org/ > >>> http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/ > >>> search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc > >>> > >>> Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out > >>> from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit > >>> may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true > >>> representation > >>> of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator action > >>> even though unintentional / delayed. > >>> > >>> Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this, > >>> so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see... > >>> https://ooni.torproject.org/ > >>> > >>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country > >>> > >>> And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer > >>> resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes > >>> around the world. > >>> > >>> And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited > >>> visibility, > >>> for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either, > >>> and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed > >>> exits as well. > >>> > >>> > >>> If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM, > >>> New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes. > >>> > >>> They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such > >>> classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels > >>> of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others > >>> can subscribe to them and Exclude at will. > >>> They can further publish patches to make tor automatically > >>> read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude > >>> and route stream requests around just those lists of censored > >>> destination:exit pairings. > >>> > >>> Ref also... > >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit > >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit > >>> > >>> > >>> In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact > >>> the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship. > >>> > >>> Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what > >>> would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream > >>> to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted... > >>> > >>> a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to > >>> use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your > >>> blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally > >>> unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one > >>> of the others tor has open? > >>> > >>> b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net, > >>> like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit > >>> or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them? > >>> > >>> c) ??? > >>> > >>> Or that some large number of topsites were censored via > >>> singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be > >>> exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where > >>> no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance > >>> is known to exist at the same time. > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> tor-relays mailing list > >>> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >>> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> tor-relays mailing listtor-relays@lists.torproject.orghttps:// > lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >> > >> > >> -- > >> One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt. > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> tor-relays mailing list > >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >> > > -- > > tor-talk mailing list - tor-t...@lists.torproject.org > > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >
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