Alicja Kario writes: > But then you may also want to add > https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23860#issuecomment-2103073417 > (while upstream OpenSSL have decided not to call it a vulnerability, > it's because they consider local side-channels outside of their threat > model and we didn't try to exploit a side channel in the single-digt > nanosecond range as that's very unlikely to be possible outside of pretty > specific scenarios)
Thanks for the pointer. The current knowledge sounds like it'd fit the "possible vulnerability" category. Note that CacheBleed, MemJam, and TeeJam are attacking sub-nanosecond timing variations. > That's the difference, my team and I aren't interested in showing attacks, > we're interested in showing absence of any signal that can be used > for performing timing-based attacks. Sounds good! ---D. J. Bernstein _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
