Ong Beng Hui wrote:
The problem of been LoS is a big problem in metro as far as I know.
You can't just put a pair of FSO gear without going to the building
owner to talk about rights and cost. Not forgetting lighting
protection and other stuff.
Murphy, Brian S CTR USAF ACC 83 NOS/Det 4 wrote:
The problem of been LoS is a big problem in metro as far as I know.
You can't just put a pair of FSO gear without going to the building
owner to talk about rights and cost. Not forgetting lighting protection
and other stuff.
Murphy, Brian S CTR USAF ACC 83 NOS/Det 4 wrote:
I haven't seen any
quire LoS, but using two or
more pairs can probably handle the 80% situation in the metro (unless there is
data to indicate otherwise).
murph
-
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 15:57:52 -0700
From: Roy
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
To: JC Dill
Cc: nanog@
Roy wrote:
JC Dill wrote:
I'm pretty sure the WISPs in the Santa Cruz and Gilroy/Morgan Hill
areas were all also taken offline due to the fiber cut. (Roy, can you
verify, for south county?) Anyone in those areas who relied on a WISP
as a backup to their fiber/copper link found that their "r
Deepak Jain wrote:
I don't mean to jump in here and state the obvious, but wireless links are
not a panacea. At least a few folks have presented that fiber grooming has
affected their *region*. It's not difficult to imagine that wherever the
"head" link side (or agg point) of these regional wire
JC Dill wrote:
> Gino Villarini wrote:
>> Good points, some variables are dependant on the network infrastructure
>> of the wireless provider. Localy, the main 2 providers have a
>> "copper/fiber independent" networks.
>>
>>
> I'm pretty sure the WISPs in the Santa Cruz and Gilroy/Morgan Hill
>
Gino Villarini wrote:
> Here in my area most of business outfits that require maximum
> availability of Internet or WAN conenctions have implemented dual
> connections from dual providers, most with a fiber/copper main and a
> fixed wireless backup. This trend goes from banks to Mcdonalds
>
>
>
I think this issue has been beat.
We're dealing with an arcaic system and protection at the same time...
Mark Jackson, CCIE 4736
Senior Network, Security and Voice Architect
858-705-1861
markcciejack...@gmail.com
Sent from my iPhone
Please excuse spelling errors
On Apr 14, 2009, at 3:24 PM, JC
Gino Villarini wrote:
SF area is serviced by Covad Wireless division among others, every major
US city is served by at least 1 or 2 reputable business class Wireless
ISP's.
AFAIK Covad Wireless is just "last mile" wireless, and the route your
packets take quickly merges with the local fibe
Gino Villarini wrote:
Good points, some variables are dependant on the network infrastructure
of the wireless provider. Localy, the main 2 providers have a
"copper/fiber independent" networks.
I'm pretty sure the WISPs in the Santa Cruz and Gilroy/Morgan Hill areas
were all also taken offli
arini; Deepak Jain; Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
Wireless RF links have their drawbacks:
1. Current GHz Frequency technology places upper limit of 1 Gbps on
point-to-point links, and distance at 1 Gbps is limited. Commercial GiGE
radios are just now appe
in such a key US metropolitan area?
-Original Message-
From: Gino Villarini [mailto:g...@aeronetpr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 1:42 PM
To: Deepak Jain; Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
Good points, some variables are dependant on the network
--Original Message-
From: Deepak Jain [mailto:dee...@ai.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 4:36 PM
To: Gino Villarini; Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
I don't mean to jump in here and state the obvious, but wireless links
are not a panacea. At least a
weather disturbance, wireless links
are subject to fade just as much as any kind of aerial wired asset.
Deepak Jain
AiNET
> -Original Message-
> From: Gino Villarini [mailto:g...@aeronetpr.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 4:12 PM
> To: Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
>
...@aeronetpr.com
Aeronet Wireless Broadband Corp.
tel 787.273.4143 fax 787.273.4145
-Original Message-
From: Jorge Amodio [mailto:jmamo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 11:21 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
> "Earth is a single point of failure.&quo
com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 11:31 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
> True enough Jorge, however, we need full-orbed perspective hereit's
> not merely beating a dead horse; as far as topic goes, it is purely
> edification in the nth degree, manner, fas
> True enough Jorge, however, we need full-orbed perspective hereit's
> not merely beating a dead horse; as far as topic goes, it is purely
> edification in the nth degree, manner, fashion. This is the lingua
> franca of this forum, and those who chose to read it, or not. Not
> merely pointed
Beckman
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 11:19
To: Dylan Ebner
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
> It will be easier to get more divergence than secure all the manholes in
> the country.
I still think skipping the securing of manhol
2
Bus. Ph.: 505.827.2851
"We move the information that moves your world."
-Original Message-
From: Jorge Amodio [mailto:jmamo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 9:21 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
> "Earth is a single point of failure.
> "Earth is a single point of failure."
On top of that, one basic principle of telecommunications:
No matter how much diversity and path redundancy, tons of concrete or
titanium sealed fiber vaults you have, in the data exchange between points
A and B there will be always two single points of fai
On Apr 13, 2009, at 8:40 PM, telmn...@757.org wrote:
Better they cut the fiber instead of Oklahoma Citying the central
office.
I'm not sure that the "someone will alway s find the weakest link"
argument can be summed up any better than this.
If you don't believe it, you all need to spend
telmn...@757.org wrote:
Presumes the perp isn't familiar with the hole, and it's security
measures. In this case, I doubt that either is the case. Pop in, snip
the wires on the horn, and do what you do.
Better they cut the fiber instead of Oklahoma Citying the central office.
If you're re
> On Tue, Apr 14, 2009 at 03:41:25AM +0200, Peter Lothberg wrote:
> > > > There are three solutions to the problem;
> > > >
> > > > A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
> > > >
> > > > B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
> > > >jus
Rofl Matt,
I was recently laid off from my job for 'economic' reasons, what you say is
deadly accurate.
Bravo! :)
On Mon, Apr 13, 2009 at 7:01 PM, Matthew Petach wrote:
> On 4/13/09, George William Herbert wrote:
> > Matthew Petach wrote:
> > >> George William Herbert wrote:
> > >> Matthew
On 4/13/09, George William Herbert wrote:
> Matthew Petach wrote:
> >> George William Herbert wrote:
> >> Matthew Petach writes:
[much material snipped in the interests of saving precious electron
resources...]
> This was all in one geographical area. Diversity out of area will get
> you
On Tue, Apr 14, 2009 at 03:41:25AM +0200, Peter Lothberg wrote:
> > > There are three solutions to the problem;
> > >
> > > A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
> > >
> > > B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
> > > just makes you tired, but nothing h
Matthew Petach wrote:
>> George William Herbert wrote:
>> Matthew Petach writes:
>> >"protected rings" are a technology of the past. Don't count on your
>> >vendor to provide "redundancy" for you. Get two unprotected runs
>> >for half the cost each, from two different providers, and verify
> > There are three solutions to the problem;
> >
> > A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
> >
> > B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
> >just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
> >
> > C: Do nothing.
> >
> >
> > As the society becomes m
On Apr 13, 2009, at 8:31 PM, Peter Lothberg wrote:
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
C: Do no
On 4/13/09, George William Herbert wrote:
> Matthew Petach writes:
> >"protected rings" are a technology of the past. Don't count on your
> >vendor to provide "redundancy" for you. Get two unprotected runs
> >for half the cost each, from two different providers, and verify the
> >path separ
But you are ignoring the cost of designing, procuring, installing,
monitoring, maintaining such a solution for the THOUSANDS of man holes
and hand holes in even a small fiber network.
The reality is, the types of outages that these things would protect
against (intentional damage to the phy
Matthew Petach writes:
>"protected rings" are a technology of the past. Don't count on your
>vendor to provide "redundancy" for you. Get two unprotected runs
>for half the cost each, from two different providers, and verify the
>path separation and diversity yourself with GIS data from the two
Presumes the perp isn't familiar with the hole, and it's security measures.
In this case, I doubt that either is the case. Pop in, snip the wires on the
horn, and do what you do.
Better they cut the fiber instead of Oklahoma Citying the central office.
Though I think networked environmental monitoring has its merits, it's
clear the technology is unproven in monitoring fiber tunnels, and my
inexperience in running and managing such tunnels makes this thread
bordering on off-topic.
I'm happy to continue conversations via email, but this will be m
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
C: Do nothing.
As the society becomes more and more dependent
Nathan Ward wrote:
Whack a $5 12v horn on it, and my bet is that it'd become a deterrent
pretty quickly.
Presumes the perp isn't familiar with the hole, and it's security
measures. In this case, I doubt that either is the case. Pop in, snip
the wires on the horn, and do what you do.
Most of
"But that would not be NEBS Complient" -PHB
I have thought of air horns in my colo cage when a tech of mine messes up.
--Original Message--
From: Nathan Ward
To: nanog list
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Sent: Apr 13, 2009 4:55 PM
On 14/04/2009, at 11:35 AM, David B
On 14/04/2009, at 11:35 AM, David Barak wrote:
In addition, as has been noted, this system wouldn't PREVENT a
failure, it would just give you some warning that a failure may be
coming, probably by a matter of minutes.
Some statistics about the effectiveness of car alarms and unmonitored
--- On Mon, 4/13/09, chris.ra...@nokia.com wrote:
>> From: Peter Beckman
>> Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
> > Total cost...is about $3000 per mile for
> equipment
> I get the feeling you haven't deployed or operated large
> networks. You never did say what
This all implies that the majority of fiber is in "tunnels" that can
be monitored. In my experience, almost none of it is in tunnels.
In NYC, it's usually buried in conduits directly under the street,
with no access, except through the man holes which are located about
every 500 feet.
In
I sense a thread moderation occurring here shortly.
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 14:39:23 EDT, Izaac said:
Do you realize that you're putting trust in the sane action of parties
who conclude their reasoning process with destruction and murder?
And how is that different
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, chris.ra...@nokia.com wrote:
I get the feeling you haven't deployed or operated large networks.
Nope.
You never did say what the multiplier was. How many miles or detection
nodes there were. Think millions. The number that popped into my head
when thinking of active
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 14:39:23 EDT, Izaac said:
> Do you realize that you're putting trust in the sane action of parties
> who conclude their reasoning process with destruction and murder?
And how is that different from a US general plotting destruction and the
killing of enemy troops during an off
Hi Peter,
You wrote:
> So, let's see. I'm pulling numbers out of my butt here,
> Total cost...is about $3000 per mile for equipment
> It could run on an overhead monorail
> Network it all
> Confickr-type domains to make sure
I get the feeling you haven't deployed or operated lar
>>> On 4/13/2009 at 1:12 PM, Peter Beckman wrote:
> On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Scott Weeks wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> --- beck...@angryox.com wrote:
>>
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access
points in favor of active monitoring with offsite access is a
better solution.
>>>
>>>
Peter Beckman [mailto:beck...@angryox.com] wrote:
>Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 11:19 AM
>To: Dylan Ebner
>Cc: nanog@nanog.org
>Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
>
>On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
>
>> It will be easier to get more divergence than secure all the
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Scott Weeks wrote:
--- beck...@angryox.com wrote:
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access
points in favor of active monitoring with offsite access is a
better solution.
The only thing missing from your plan was a cost analysis. Cost of each,
plus op
--- beck...@angryox.com wrote:
>> I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access
>> points in favor of active monitoring with offsite access is a
>> better solution.
>
> The only thing missing from your plan was a cost analysis. Cost of each,
> plus operational costs, * however many
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, chris.ra...@nokia.com wrote:
Peter Beckman [mailto:beck...@angryox.com] wrote:
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 11:19 AM
To: Dylan Ebner
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
It will be easier to get more divergence
On Sun, Apr 12, 2009 at 03:37:00AM +, Paul Vixie wrote:
> as long as the west's ideological opponents want terror rather than panic,
> and also to inflict long term losses rather than short term losses, that's
> true. in this light you can hopefully understand why bollards to protect
> interne
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
It will be easier to get more divergence than secure all the manholes in
the country.
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access points in favor
of active monitoring with offsite access is a better solution. You can't
keep people out,
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dorn Hetzel wrote:
I guess the next generation fiber networks will need to be installed with
tunnel boring machines and just not surface anywhere except the endpoints
:) After all, undersea cables get along just fine without convenient
access along their length...
Boat an
Or skip the locks and fill the manholes with sand. Then provide the service
folks those big suction trucks to remove the sand for servicing :)
On Mon, Apr 13, 2009 at 12:28 PM, Andy Ringsmuth wrote:
>
> On Apr 13, 2009, at 11:12 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
>
> Manhole locks are just going to
I guess the next generation fiber networks will need to be installed with
tunnel boring machines and just not surface anywhere except the endpoints
:) After all, undersea cables get along just fine without convenient access
along their length...
On Mon, Apr 13, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Mikael Abrahamsso
On 4/13/09, Dylan Ebner wrote:
> My point is, it is getting harder and harder to gurantee path divergence
> and sometimes the redundancies need to be built into the workflow
> instead of IT.
Actually, in many ways it's getting easier; now, you can sign an NDA
with your fiber providers and get
On Apr 13, 2009, at 11:12 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
Manhole locks are just going to stop vandalism, and I think the
threat
to obstruction calculation just doesn't add up for that small level
of
isolated cases.
It doesn't stop it, it just makes it slightly harder, and they'll go
afte
and the
wiring frame boxes for pots line neither.. Its all of a matter of how much cash
they wanna throw at it...
Sent on the Now Network� from my Sprint® BlackBerry
-Original Message-
From: "Dylan Ebner"
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2009 09:57:30
To:
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
Manhole locks are just going to stop vandalism, and I think the threat
to obstruction calculation just doesn't add up for that small level of
isolated cases.
It doesn't stop it, it just makes it slightly harder, and they'll go after
another point.
ner, Network Engineer
Consulting Radiologists, Ltd.
1221 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55403
ph. 612.573.2236 fax. 612.573.2250
dylan.eb...@crlmed.com
www.consultingradiologists.com
-Original Message-
From: Joe Greco [mailto:jgr...@ns.sol.net]
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2009 7:12 AM
To:
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 09:18:04 -0500
Stephen Sprunk wrote:
> Mike Lewinski wrote:
> > Joe Greco wrote:
> >> Which brings me to a new point: if we accept that "security by
> >> obscurity is not security," then, what (practical thing) IS
> >> security?
> >
> > Obscurity as a principle works just fi
Mike Lewinski wrote:
Joe Greco wrote:
Which brings me to a new point: if we accept that "security by
obscurity is not security," then, what (practical thing) IS security?
Obscurity as a principle works just fine provided the given token is
obscure enough. Ideally there are layers of "securit
>
> Joe Greco wrote:
>
> > My point was more the inverse, which is that a determined, equipped,
> > and knowledgeable attacker is a very difficult thing to defend against.
>
> "The Untold Story of the World's Biggest Diamond Heist" published
> recently in Wired was a good read on that subject:
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Christopher Morrow wrote:
I'm not sure that the manholes == atm discussion is valid, but in the
end the same thing is prone to happen to the manholes, there isn't
going to be a unique key per manhole, at best it'll be 1/region or
1/manhole-owner. In the end that key is compr
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Joe Greco wrote:
Public key crypto is, pretty much by definition, reliant on the
obscurity of private keys in order to make it work.
In security terms, public key crypto is not "security by obscurity", as
the obscurity part is related to how the method works, and the key
Joe Greco wrote:
My point was more the inverse, which is that a determined, equipped,
and knowledgeable attacker is a very difficult thing to defend against.
"The Untold Story of the World's Biggest Diamond Heist" published
recently in Wired was a good read on that subject:
http://www.wired
> An easy way to describe what your saying is "Security by obscurity is
> not security"
Yes and no. From a certain point of view, security is almost always
closely tied to obscurity.
A cylinder lock is simply a device that operates through principles that
are relatively unknown to the average
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Lamar Owen wrote:
The locking covers I have seen here put the lock(s) on the inside cover cam
jackscrew (holes through the jackscrew close to the inside cover seal rod
nut), rather than on the outside cover, thus keeping the padlocks out of the
weather.
I'm starting to wo
Roger Marquis wrote:
>> Why didn't the "man in the street" pharmacy have its own backup plans?
>
> I assume they, as most of us, believed the government was taking care of
> the country's critical infrastructure. Interesting how well this
> illustrates the growing importance of the Internet vis-
An easy way to describe what your saying is "Security by obscurity is
not security"
On Apr 11, 2009, at 8:31 AM, Joe Greco wrote:
Jo¢ wrote:
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber sh
Christopher Morrow writes:
> and I also would ask.. what's the cost/risk here? 'We' lost at best
> ~1day for some folks in the outage, nothing global and nothing
> earth-shattering... This has happened (this sort of thing) 1 time in
> how many years? Expending $$ and time and people to go 'put p
Jorge Amodio wrote:
s/DARPA/ARPA/; s/BBM/BBN/; s/Internet/ARPAnet/.
/DARPA/ARPA/ may be splitting hairs. According to
http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ii_roberts.htm
"DARPA head Charlie Hertzfeld promised IPTO Director Bob Taylor a million
dollars to build a distributed communications netwo
, April 11, 2009 6:02 PM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Sean Donelan wrote:
>
> Uh, not exactly. There was diversity in this case, but there was also
> N+1 breaks. Outside of a few counties in the Bay Area, the rest of
> the country's telecommunication sy
On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Joe Greco wrote:
>> On Saturday 11 April 2009 08:31:55 Joe Greco wrote:
>> > Speaking of that, a manhole cover is
>> > typically protecting some hole, accessway, or vault that's made out of
>> > concrete.
>>
>> An oxyacetylene torch or a plasma cutter will slice th
Sean Donelan wrote:
>
> Uh, not exactly. There was diversity in this case, but there was also
> N+1 breaks. Outside of a few counties in the Bay Area, the rest of
> the country's telecommunication system was unaffected. So in that
> sense the system worked as designed.
>
About eight o
Don't really care so much about the bank's security, especially if it was
one that received some the bailout money :)
I was more worried about if people could make withdraws from their bank
accounts. Deposits they could do as they could enter them in later but
withdraws I think would be different.
Mike Lyon wrote:
> Anyone know how banks in the Bay Area did through this? I wonder how many
> banks went dark and whether they had any backup plans/connectivity. Me
> thinks its doubtful.
>
> ...
Because of the loss of the alarm systems, many banks went to a method
where only one or two people we
While OT the news reports indicated ATMs were offline and many credit card
processing machines were down. This is no big shock because many ATM
networks are on frame relay and POS credit card machines use POTS lines.
The outage also impacted mobile service too if it hadn't been said.
I hope we c
> Read the original DARPA papers, they were not about making sure grandma
> could still make a phone call.
That's a great explanation in few words.
> Everything fails sometimes. What's your plan?
Even the failover plans ...
Cheers
Jorge
Anyone know how banks in the Bay Area did through this? I wonder how many
banks went dark and whether they had any backup plans/connectivity. Me
thinks its doubtful.
I also wonder if the bigger pharmacies such as Longs, Walgreens, Rite-Aid,
Etc had thought about these kinds of issues? I personally
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Roger Marquis wrote:
The real problem is route redundancy. This is what the original contract
from DARPA to BBM, to create the Internet, was about! "The net" was
created to enable communications bttn point A and point B in this exact
scenario.
Uh, not exactly. There was
> On Saturday 11 April 2009 08:31:55 Joe Greco wrote:
> > Speaking of that, a manhole cover is
> > typically protecting some hole, accessway, or vault that's made out of
> > concrete.
>
> An oxyacetylene torch or a plasma cutter will slice through regular steel
> manhole covers in minutes.
Yes,
> The real problem is route redundancy. This is what the original contract
> from DARPA to BBM, to create the Internet, was about!
s/DARPA/ARPA/; s/BBM/BBN/; s/Internet/ARPAnet/.
BBN won the contract to build the first four IMPs.
Theory and research about it is older, look at:
http://www.lk.cs.
Jo? wrote:
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
at least should they? Manhole covers "can" be keyed. For those of
you arguing that this is not enough, I would say a
> You can cut the concrete, too, for that matter, with oxyacetylene, as long as
> you wear certain protective gear. We have a few vault covers here that are
> concrete covering the largest vaults we have. You need more than a manhole
> hook to get one of those covers up.
And when you think
On Saturday 11 April 2009 08:31:55 Joe Greco wrote:
> Speaking of that, a manhole cover is
> typically protecting some hole, accessway, or vault that's made out of
> concrete.
An oxyacetylene torch or a plasma cutter will slice through regular steel
manhole covers in minutes.
You can cut the co
The best protecion is good engineering taking advantage of
technologies and architecures
available since long time ago at any of the different network layers.
Why network operators/carriers don't do it ?, it's another issue and
most of the time
is a question of bottom line numbers for which there
On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Joe Greco:
>
>> The ATM machine is somewhat protected for the extremely obvious reason
>> that it has cash in it, but an ATM is hardly impervious.
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P8WM8ZZDHk
>
> Heh. Once you install ATMs into solid
* Joe Greco:
> The ATM machine is somewhat protected for the extremely obvious reason
> that it has cash in it, but an ATM is hardly impervious.
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P8WM8ZZDHk
Heh. Once you install ATMs into solid walls, the attacks get a tad
more interesting. In some places of
Once upon a time, Jo¢ said:
> Yes if enough time goes by anything can happen, but how can one
> argue an ATM machince that has (at times) thousands of dollars stands
> out 24/7 without more immediate wealth. Perhaps I am missing
> something here, do the Cops stake out those areas? dunno
We've had
> Jo¢ wrote:
> > I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
> > All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
> > data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
> > at least should they? Manhole covers "can" be keyed. For those of
> > you arguing that this is not
Jo¢ wrote:
>
> I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
> All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
> data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
> at least should they? Manhole covers "can" be keyed. For those of
> you arguing that this is not enough
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
at least should they? Manhole covers "can" be keyed. For those of
you arguing that this is not enough, I would say at least it
On Apr 10, 2009, at 3:41 PM, Scott Doty wrote:
George William Herbert wrote:
Scott Doty wrote:
(Personally, I can think of a "MAE-Clueless" episode that was
worse than this, but that was in the 90's...)
The gas main strike out front of the building in Santa Clara?
Or something else?
-ge
George William Herbert wrote:
Scott Doty wrote:
(Personally, I can think of a "MAE-Clueless" episode that was worse than
this, but that was in the 90's...)
The gas main strike out front of the building in Santa Clara?
Or something else?
-george william herbert
gherb...@retro.com
Scott Doty wrote:
>(Personally, I can think of a "MAE-Clueless" episode that was worse than
>this, but that was in the 90's...)
The gas main strike out front of the building in Santa Clara?
Or something else?
-george william herbert
gherb...@retro.com
No RF, no WPS.
If all the base stations are knocked out in a region, and there is no
"over" coverage from towers out of the affected region then there are no
channels to which priority access can be allotted.
A potential remedy (at least for conventional cell phones) would be to
scatter bac
On Thu, Apr 9, 2009 at 5:52 PM, Ben Scott wrote:
>
> #ifdef CONSPIRACY_THEORIST
>
> What if this isn't simple vandalism?
>
> #endif
>
If my read is correct, this is multiple cuts in multiple locations.
To answer the what-if ("What if this isn't simple vandalism?") : It's not.
-jamie
On Thu, 9 Apr 2009, Jared Mauch wrote:
That AT&T has stopped provisioning protection fiber for automatic restoral
is mind boggling.
Only helps with N-1 breaks. Unfortunately, sometimes there are N+1
breaks. Check the NANOG archives, I believe there were 5 breaks in one
day in the 1990's; an
ge-
> From: David Edwards [mailto:da...@reliablehosting.com]
> Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 1:06 PM
> To: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
>
> At 12:55 PM 4/9/2009, you wrote:
> > >From the news coverage it appears to be in the general ar
On Thu, Apr 9, 2009 at 5:29 PM, Jared Mauch wrote:
>> That our crack (or on crack) govt contracting/emergency-preparedness staff
>> didn't demand protected facilities for 911 is another mind boggling issue.
>
> This costs $$$ and usually isn't a problem as there are other ways to
> communicate.
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