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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 11:11 PM, JC Dill wrote:
> Owen DeLong wrote:
>>
>> Heck, at this point, I'd be OK with it being a regulatory issue.
>
> What entity do you see as having any possibility of effective regulatory
> control over the internet?
>
>
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To cut through the noise and non-relevant discussion, let's see if we can
boil this down to a couple of issues:
1. Should ISPs be responsible for abuse from within their customer base?
1a. If so, how?
2. Should hosting providers also be held respons
Owen DeLong wrote:
Heck, at this point, I'd be OK with it being a regulatory issue.
What entity do you see as having any possibility of effective regulatory
control over the internet?
The reason we have these problems to begin with is because there is no
way for people (or government regu
On Jun 8, 2010, at 9:26 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
>> Problem is there's no financial liability for producing massively
>> exploitable software.
>> No financial penalty for operating a compromised system.
>> No penalty for ignoring abuse complaints.
>> Etc.
>>
>> Imagine how fast things would c
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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 10:22 PM, Owen DeLong wrote:
>
>> Please, be for real -- the criminals go after the entrenched majority.
>> If it were any other OS, the story would be the same.
>>
> If this were true, the criminals would be all over Apache an
On Jun 8, 2010, at 9:06 PM, JC Dill wrote:
> Dave Rand wrote:
>> I'm fond of getting the issues addressed by getting the ISPs to be involved
>> with the problem. If that means users get charged "clean up" fees instead
>> of a "security" fee, that's fine.
>
> "I urge all my competitors to do th
On Jun 8, 2010, at 9:05 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote:
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>
> On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 8:59 PM, JC Dill wrote:
>
>>
>> I'm still truly amazed that no one has sic'd a lawyer on Microsoft for
>> creating an "attractive nuisance" - an operating system that
On Jun 8, 2010, at 8:01 PM, Jorge Amodio wrote:
> Sent from my iToilet
>
> why you will penalize with fees the end customer that may not know
> that her system has been compromised because what she pays to Joe
> Antivirus/Security/Firewall/Crapware is not effective against Billy
> the nerd insec
I'm all for that, but, point is that people who fail to meet that standard are
currently getting a free ride. IMHO, they should pay and they should have
the recourse of being (at least partially) reimbursed by their at-fault software
vendors for contributory negligence.
Owen
On Jun 8, 2010, at 7:
At 15:07 08/06/2010 -0400, J. Oquendo wrote:
> At http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article7144856.ece
>
> A report by Albright¹s group said that a cyber attack on the critical
> infrastructure of a Nato country could equate to an armed attack,
justifying
> retaliation.
>
> Eneken Ti
On 09-Jun-2010, at 12:36 PM, Patrick W. Gilmore wrote:
> On Jun 9, 2010, at 12:26 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
>
>>> Problem is there's no financial liability for producing massively
>>> exploitable software.
>>> No financial penalty for operating a compromised system.
>>> No penalty for ignoring
Hi,
On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 6:50 AM, Dale Cornman wrote:
> Has anyone ever heard of a multi-homed enterprise not running bgp with
> either of 2 providers, but instead, each provider statically routes a block
> to their common customer and also each originates this block in BGP? One
> of the ISP'
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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 9:36 PM, Patrick W. Gilmore
wrote:
>
> But it is not -just- market share. There are a lot more Windows Mobile
> compromises, viruses, etc., than iOS, Symbian, and RIM. I think
> combined. Yet Windows Mobile has the lowest ma
[In the message entitled "Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers" on
Jun 9, 0:26, Steven Bellovin writes:]
>
> A liability scheme, with penalties on users and vendors, is certainly =
> worth considering. Such a scheme would also have side-effects -- think =
> of the effect on open so
On Jun 9, 2010, at 12:26 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
>> Problem is there's no financial liability for producing massively
>> exploitable software.
>> No financial penalty for operating a compromised system.
>> No penalty for ignoring abuse complaints.
>> Etc.
>>
>> Imagine how fast things would c
On 6/8/2010 23:22, Paul Ferguson wrote:
> Again, you can all continue to dance around and ignore the problem & chance
> the probability that the U.S. Government will step in and force you to do
> it.
>
> Pick your poison.
Or the world government will (note misspelled "NATO" in the Subject:).
--
> Problem is there's no financial liability for producing massively exploitable
> software.
> No financial penalty for operating a compromised system.
> No penalty for ignoring abuse complaints.
> Etc.
>
> Imagine how fast things would change in Redmond if Micr0$0ft had to pay the
> cleanup cost
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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 9:06 PM, JC Dill wrote:
> Dave Rand wrote:
>>
>> I'm fond of getting the issues addressed by getting the ISPs to be
>> involved
>> with the problem. If that means users get charged "clean up" fees
>> instead
>> of a "security
Dave Rand wrote:
I'm fond of getting the issues addressed by getting the ISPs to be involved
with the problem. If that means users get charged "clean up" fees instead
of a "security" fee, that's fine.
"I urge all my competitors to do that."
The problem isn't that this is a bad idea, the prob
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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 8:59 PM, JC Dill wrote:
>
> I'm still truly amazed that no one has sic'd a lawyer on Microsoft for
> creating an "attractive nuisance" - an operating system that is too
> easily hacked and used to attack innocent victims, and w
Jorge Amodio wrote:
None of this needs to be done for free. There needs to be a "security
fee" charged _all_ customers, which would fund the abuse desk.
With more than 100,000,000 compromised computers out there, it's really
time for us to step up to the plate, and make this happen.
On Tue, 08 Jun 2010 22:01:35 CDT, Jorge Amodio said:
> On the other hand think as the Internet being a vast ocean where the
> bad guys keep dumping garbage, you can't control or filter the
> currents that are constantly changing and you neither can inspect
> every water molecule, then what do you
Sent from my iToilet
why you will penalize with fees the end customer that may not know
that her system has been compromised because what she pays to Joe
Antivirus/Security/Firewall/Crapware is not effective against Billy
the nerd insecure code programmer ?
No doubt ISPs can do something, but wit
[In the message entitled "Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers" on
Jun 8, 13:33, Owen DeLong writes:]
>
> I realize your fond of punishing all of us to subsidize the ignorant, =
> but I would rather see those with compromised machines pay the bill for =
> letting their machines get c
Lots of finger pointing.
Lots of discussion about who should pay, and so forth.
How about we just take responsibility for our own part. Don't malicious
traffic in or out.?
If it can't move, it will die.
--
Somebody should have said:
A democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have fo
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 8, 2010, at 3:27 PM, "J. Oquendo" wrote:
> Jorge Amodio wrote:
>>> None of this needs to be done for free. There needs to be a "security
>>> fee" charged _all_ customers, which would fund the abuse desk.
>>>
>>
>>
>>> With more than 100,000,000 compromised computer
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 8, 2010, at 3:30 PM, Brielle Bruns wrote:
> On 6/8/10 2:12 PM, Dave Rand wrote:
>
>> It's really way, way past time for us to actually deal with compromised
>> computers on our networks. Abuse desks need to have the power to filter
>> customers immediately on notific
> Buy 10,000 shares of every South Korean company you can find, short them, then
> launch an attack from Seoul. Then sit back and profit.
>
> Oh, quit looking at me like that. You know you were all thinking it. ;)
Yes and then deposit the bounty on a Nigerian bank ...
I wonder why there is so muc
Dave,
I realize your fond of punishing all of us to subsidize the ignorant, but I
would rather see those with compromised machines pay the bill for letting their
machines get compromised than have to subsidize their ignorant or worse
behavior.
Owen
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 8, 2010, at 1:12
* globic...@gmail.com (Andy B.) [Tue 08 Jun 2010, 16:28 CEST]:
I finally decided to shut down all peerings and brought them back
one by one.
Sadly that's often the way it has to be done, modulo mild tweaks.
Everything is stable again, but I don't like the way I had to deal
with it since it w
Actually I was thinking of my neighbor's noisy dog and what a predator
strike to his house would do. :)
-Original Message-
From: valdis.kletni...@vt.edu [mailto:valdis.kletni...@vt.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2010 8:32 PM
To: Jorge Amodio
Cc: na...@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Nato warns of s
We're using it...;)
Please see inline...
Paul
1) using the new Team Cymru BOGON lists *via BGP*
Yes
2) use the new v4 list
Yes
3) use the v6 list
Yes
4) monitor the Cymru BGP session as diligently as they would a
peer/provider session
Spot check it - in the several years we've used the o
On Tue, 08 Jun 2010 19:23:17 CDT, Jorge Amodio said:
> > So let's say a cyber-attack originates from Chinese script kiddie.
> >
> > Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
> > Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
> > Lithuania, Luxembourg,
off and on list feedback welcome.
I'd personally like to get an idea of how many people are:
1) using the new Team Cymru BOGON lists *via BGP*
2) use the new v4 list
3) use the v6 list
4) monitor the Cymru BGP session as diligently as they would a
peer/provider session
5) attempted the BOGON peer
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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 5:45 PM, Dorn Hetzel wrote:
> Perhaps a government operated black-hole list, run by same friendly folks
> that run the no-fly list, with a law that says no US ISP can send packets
> to or accept packets from any IP on the list.
Changes the meaning of "guns a blazing"
Bryan
On Jun 8, 2010, at 8:31 PM, "jim deleskie" wrote:
> Military reply doesn't have to mean bombs and guns. There is nothing
> keeping it form mean offensive cyber counter attacks. This would mean
> manage the battlefields :)
>
> On Tue, Jun 8, 2010
Perhaps a government operated black-hole list, run by same friendly folks
that run the no-fly list, with a law that says no US ISP can send packets to
or accept packets from any IP on the list.
Now that would be some real fun to watch! :)
On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 8:27 PM, Dave Rand wrote:
> [In th
[In the message entitled "Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers" on
Jun 8, 14:30, Brielle Bruns writes:]
>
> Legit customers get caught in the cross-fire, and they suffer - but at
> the same time, those legit customers are the only ones that will be able
> to force a change on said
> So let's say a cyber-attack originates from Chinese script kiddie.
>
> Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
> Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
> Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
> Slovakia, Sl
Military reply doesn't have to mean bombs and guns. There is nothing
keeping it form mean offensive cyber counter attacks. This would mean
manage the battlefields :)
On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 7:46 PM, Gadi Evron wrote:
> On 6/9/10 12:50 AM, Marshall Eubanks wrote:
>>
>> What any of this has to do
Have no fear geolocation is here, you are not in peril. It will be a
surgical strike. If Google and others are willing to assist, they will know
exactly where to send the JDAM.
Chrome now collects data from your wireless card if you let it. When you are
asked where you are, Chrome then also reco
On 6/9/10 12:50 AM, Marshall Eubanks wrote:
What any of this has to do with configuring routers escapes me.
I think Jay is worried about steps operators may have to take during
such an eventuality of an attack, not to mention the collateral damage
to the Internet infrastructure if DDoS is wha
On 6/8/10 10:07 PM, J. Oquendo wrote:
So NANOGer's, what will be the game plan when something like this
happens, will you be joining NATO and pulling fiber. I wonder when all
types of warm-fuzzy filtering will be drafted into networking: "Thou
shall re-read RFC4953 lest you want Predator strikes
> The Cisco 7600 and 6500 platforms are getting fairly old and have
> underpowered cpus these days.
the hamsters in them were never well fed, ever. though i have never run
one, too yucchhy, i have measured receiving a research feed from one.
over ten minutes for a full table while a router takes
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On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 1:30 PM, Brielle Bruns wrote:
> On 6/8/10 2:12 PM, Dave Rand wrote:
>
>> It's really way, way past time for us to actually deal with compromised
>> computers on our networks. Abuse desks need to have the power to filter
>> cus
On Jun 8, 2010, at 5:08 PM, Peter Boone wrote:
So let's say a cyber-attack originates from Chinese script kiddie.
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
On Jun 8, 2010, at 5:15 13PM, Brielle Bruns wrote:
> On 6/8/10 3:08 PM, Peter Boone wrote:
>> So let's say a cyber-attack originates from Chinese script kiddie.
>>
>> Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
>> Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ital
On 2010-06-08 13:03, J. Oquendo wrote:
Jorge Amodio wrote:
All humor aside, I'm curious to know what can anyone truly do at the end
of the day if say a botnet was used to instigate a situation. Surely
someone would have to say something to the tune of "better now than
never" to implement BCP fil
On 6/8/10 3:08 PM, Peter Boone wrote:
So let's say a cyber-attack originates from Chinese script kiddie.
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Po
So let's say a cyber-attack originates from Chinese script kiddie.
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spa
On 6/8/2010 15:44, J. Oquendo wrote:
> Brielle Bruns wrote:
>> Problem is, there's no financial penalties for providers who ignore
>> abuse coming from their network.
>>
>> DNSbl lists work only because after a while, providers can't ignore
>> their customer complaints and exodus when they dig deep
Brielle Bruns wrote:
> Problem is, there's no financial penalties for providers who ignore
> abuse coming from their network.
>
> DNSbl lists work only because after a while, providers can't ignore
> their customer complaints and exodus when they dig deep into the
> bottom line.
>
> We've got sever
On 6/8/10 2:12 PM, Dave Rand wrote:
It's really way, way past time for us to actually deal with compromised
computers on our networks. Abuse desks need to have the power to filter
customers immediately on notification of activity. We need to have tools to
help us identify compromised customers
Jorge Amodio wrote:
>> None of this needs to be done for free. There needs to be a "security
>> fee" charged _all_ customers, which would fund the abuse desk.
>>
>
>
>> With more than 100,000,000 compromised computers out there, it's really
>> time for us to step up to the plate, and make
> None of this needs to be done for free. There needs to be a "security
> fee" charged _all_ customers, which would fund the abuse desk.
> With more than 100,000,000 compromised computers out there, it's really
> time for us to step up to the plate, and make this happen.
Or you should send the b
[In the message entitled "Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers" on
Jun 8, 16:03, "J. Oquendo" writes:]
>
> All humor aside, I'm curious to know what can anyone truly do at the end
> of the day if say a botnet was used to instigate a situation. Surely
> someone would have to say somet
Jorge Amodio wrote:
>> So NANOGer's, what will be the game plan when something like this
>> happens, will you be joining NATO and pulling fiber. I wonder when all
>> types of warm-fuzzy filtering will be drafted into networking: "Thou
>> shall re-read RFC4953 lest you want Predator strikes on your
> So NANOGer's, what will be the game plan when something like this
> happens, will you be joining NATO and pulling fiber. I wonder when all
> types of warm-fuzzy filtering will be drafted into networking: "Thou
> shall re-read RFC4953 lest you want Predator strikes on your NAP
> locations...
We h
>From the NetSec mailing list...
> At http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article7144856.ece
>
> June 6, 2010
> Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers
> Michael Smith and Peter Warren
>
> NATO is considering the use of military force against enemies who launch
> cyber attacks on its
On Tue, Jun 08, 2010 at 12:22:04PM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote:
>
> The Cisco 7600 and 6500 platforms are getting fairly old and have
> underpowered cpus these days.
>
> Starting in SXH the control plane did not scale quite as well as in
> SXF. This got better in SXI, but is not back on par with SX
Hi Andy,
We have had similar problems with s720/3bxl on exchanges with large
numbers of peers. Exact same symptoms, can be triggered by any
significant UPDATE flux, even iBGP originated path-hunts. This problem
is compounded if you are taking full tables on the same device, to the
extent that th
On Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 7:27 AM, Andy B. wrote:
> I finally decided to shut down all peerings and brought them back one by one.
>
> Everything is stable again, but I don't like the way I had to deal
> with it since it will most likely happen again when DECIX or an other
> IX we're at is having issu
On Jun 8, 2010, at 10:27 AM, Andy B. wrote:
> I finally decided to shut down all peerings and brought them back one by one.
>
> Everything is stable again, but I don't like the way I had to deal
> with it since it will most likely happen again when DECIX or an other
> IX we're at is having issue
[Apologies for duplicates]
APNIC 30 - Call for Papers
The APNIC 30 Program Committee is now seeking presentations for APNIC
30 to be held at Gold Co
I finally decided to shut down all peerings and brought them back one by one.
Everything is stable again, but I don't like the way I had to deal
with it since it will most likely happen again when DECIX or an other
IX we're at is having issues.
I've seen a few BGP convergence discussions on NANOG
Dear Andy
This morning there was an ethernet loop problem on DECIX, causing many
BGP sessions to flap throughout the entire platform.
While this can happen, I am myself facing with BGP convergence
problems on our DECIX router (SUP720-3BXL with IOS SXI3).
De DECIX loop has been solved two hours
Hi,
This morning there was an ethernet loop problem on DECIX, causing many
BGP sessions to flap throughout the entire platform.
While this can happen, I am myself facing with BGP convergence
problems on our DECIX router (SUP720-3BXL with IOS SXI3).
De DECIX loop has been solved two hours ago, but
Hi,
On 7 Jun 2010, at 23:02, Joel M Snyder wrote:
> On 6/7/10 11:51 PM:
>> Has anyone ever heard of a multi-homed enterprise not running bgp with
>> either of 2 providers, but instead, each provider statically routes a block
>> to their common customer and also each originates this block in BG
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