On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 07:48:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular,
> > but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before,
> > either within Debian or
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 07:48:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular,
> > but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before,
> > either within Debian o
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
> > of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
> > then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
> > introd
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
> > of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
> > then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
> > intro
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
> of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
> then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
> introducing ne
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
> of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
> then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
> introducing n
> On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to
> > > understand?
> > They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options
> > on them.
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 12:45:23AM +1000, Anthony Town
> On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to
> > > understand?
> > They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options
> > on them.
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 12:45:23AM +1000, Anthony Tow
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to
> > understand?
> They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options
> on them.
Actually, they do have the same options on them: Yes, No, and Fu
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to
> > understand?
> They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options
> on them.
Actually, they do have the same options on them: Yes, No, and F
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference"
> > > to. The option ranked first is more important than the others
> > > because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the
> > > others. That is the fol
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference"
> > > to. The option ranked first is more important than the others
> > > because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the
> > > others. That is the fo
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > * What to require for an option to meet quorum
> > > (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
> > > the option, and compare against quoru
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > * What to require for an option to meet quorum
> > > (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
> > > the option, and compare against quor
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
> > > than the other preferences?
> > You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preferenc
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
> > > than the other preferences?
> > You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preferen
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
> > than the other preferences?
>
> You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The
> option ranked first is more important than the others
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
> > than the other preferences?
>
> You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The
> option ranked first is more important than the other
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:22:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Yes. Take a single vote that ranks:
> > [ 2 ] A (change the constitution)
> > [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution)
> > [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution)
> > You'll note that B
I'm chopping lots of stuff out here.
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > > constitution, while a vote in favor of B is a vote in favor of not
> > > > modifying the constitution.
> > > This, however, doesn't make any sense. Again, there is no such thing
> > > as a v
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:22:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Yes. Take a single vote that ranks:
> > [ 2 ] A (change the constitution)
> > [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution)
> > [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution)
> > You'll note that
I'm chopping lots of stuff out here.
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > > constitution, while a vote in favor of B is a vote in favor of not
> > > > modifying the constitution.
> > > This, however, doesn't make any sense. Again, there is no such thing
> > > as a
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 09:42:57PM +, Matthew Woodcraft wrote:
> Note that the two elections aren't strictly relevant - they're conducted
> under 'Concorde Vote Counting', but not under the Standard Resolution
> Procedure (5.2.7).
Ahh, so they are.
> Consider that there might be an existing '
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > * What to require for an option to meet quorum
> > (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
> >the option, and compare against quorum)
This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had wa
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 09:42:57PM +, Matthew Woodcraft wrote:
> Note that the two elections aren't strictly relevant - they're conducted
> under 'Concorde Vote Counting', but not under the Standard Resolution
> Procedure (5.2.7).
Ahh, so they are.
> Consider that there might be an existing
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > * What to require for an option to meet quorum
> > (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
> >the option, and compare against quorum)
This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had w
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 06:31:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> In our past votes, we've variously had:
>
> Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
> Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
> Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
> New Logo: [submissions, includin
Anthony Towns writes:
> In our past votes, we've variously had:
>
> Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
> Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
> Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
> New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further
Discussion
>
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 06:31:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> In our past votes, we've variously had:
>
> Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
> Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
> Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
> New Logo: [submissions, includi
Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> In our past votes, we've variously had:
>
> Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
> Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
> Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
> New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + F
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 12:45:24AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[Status-quo versus Further Discussion and No]
> I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the
> developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion
> period.
Okay, let's ignore what I've said pr
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 12:45:24AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[Status-quo versus Further Discussion and No]
> I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the
> developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion
> period.
Okay, let's ignore what I've said p
scussion" ...
> > > > > VVVV
> > > > >[ A ] [_B_] Original proposal
> > > > >[ _ ] [_C_] First amendment
> > > > >[ _ ] [_D_] Second amendment
> > > > >[ _ ] [_E_] Third amendment
> > > &g
I am
simply combining these ballots in a single message.
The three Y/N/F ballots are for which *resolution* wins the initial vote.
> You do understand the difference, I hope?
At one point I would have hoped you'd understand the difference between
a message that combines two ballots and a
scussion" ...
> > > > > VVVV
> > > > >[ A ] [_B_] Original proposal
> > > > >[ _ ] [_C_] First amendment
> > > > >[ _ ] [_D_] Second amendment
> > > > >[ _ ] [_E_] Third amendment
> > > &g
ots are for which *resolution* wins the initial vote.
> You do understand the difference, I hope?
At one point I would have hoped you'd understand the difference between
a message that combines two ballots and a ballot that does, but whatever.
> > > > I'd this make a messa
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people
> might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've
> got no chance of getting their first preference.
If they don't want to put their fir
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people
> might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've
> got no chance of getting their first preference.
If they don't want to put their fi
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60
> > of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further
> > Discussion/No, while
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60
> > of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further
> > Discussion/No, while
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> > > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> > > supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
> > That's a relatively weak crite
> > > > My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
> > > > N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
> > > > would vote for "further discussion".
> > > Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves,
> > > "well, I'm n
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> > > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> > > supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
> > That's a relatively weak crit
> > > > My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
> > > > N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
> > > > would vote for "further discussion".
> > > Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves,
> > > "well, I'm
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
> > > N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
> > > would vote for "further discussion".
> > Well, they might do that, yes. Or els
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
> > > N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
> > > would vote for "further discussion".
> > Well, they might do that, yes. Or el
I'm back from vacation now...I've read the other posts, but I'm
probably not going to respond to them (too many to process all at
once...) So I'll just pick up here.
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> > > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> > > supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM
I'm back from vacation now...I've read the other posts, but I'm
probably not going to respond to them (too many to process all at
once...) So I'll just pick up here.
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single optio
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> > supermajority requirement
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> > > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> > > supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25P
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> > supermajority requiremen
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all things
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
> pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
> supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all thing
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
> > > you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
> > > on the ballot:
> > > Yes on A and B
> > > Yes on A, no on B
> > > Yes on B no on
Damn, I've got to stop postponing and forgetting these things.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:08:50AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is
> > one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner
> > should be from the Smith set
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
> > > you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
> > > on the ballot:
> > > Yes on A and B
> > > Yes on A, no on B
> > > Yes on B no on
Damn, I've got to stop postponing and forgetting these things.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:08:50AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is
> > one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner
> > should be from the Smith se
> > Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
> > you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
> > on the ballot:
> > Yes on A and B
> > Yes on A, no on B
> > Yes on B no on A
> > no on A, no on B
> > further discussion.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 1
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 07:35:17PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I claim that "my first preference is yes on option A", is a yes vote
> > > for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies.
> > > Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why?
> > You're also claiming that
> > Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
> > you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
> > on the ballot:
> > Yes on A and B
> > Yes on A, no on B
> > Yes on B no on A
> > no on A, no on B
> > further discussion.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
> > > usefully different.
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > They're procedurally different, however.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 12:3
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 07:35:17PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I claim that "my first preference is yes on option A", is a yes vote
> > > for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies.
> > > Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why?
> > You're also claiming that
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
> > > usefully different.
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > They're procedurally different, however.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 12:
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
> > usefully different.
> They're procedurally different, however.
Not particularly so. If "No" wins
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
> > > doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
> > > doesn't match the way most systems work (which only provide "No, don't
> > > resol
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
> > usefully different.
> They're procedurally different, however.
Not particularly so. If "No" win
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 06:11:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
> > doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
> > doesn't match the way mos
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
> > > doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
> > > doesn't match the way most systems work (which only provide "No, don't
> > > reso
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
> > > ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
> > > matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to
> > > flame each o
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 06:11:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
> > doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
> > doesn't match the way mo
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
> > > ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
> > > matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to
> > > flame each
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 03:17:05AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
> > ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
> > matter again, and by doing n
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 03:17:05AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
> > ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
> > matter again, and by doing
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
> ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
> matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to
> flame each other. I personal
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:45:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme.
Ok...
By definition, any member of the smith set is a plausible winner of
a vote. So there's no way to show an implausible winner, if we've
restricted the discussion to the
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
> ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
> matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to
> flame each other. I persona
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:45:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme.
Ok...
By definition, any member of the smith set is a plausible winner of
a vote. So there's no way to show an implausible winner, if we've
restricted the discussion to th
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:53:29AM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
> A>B, B>C, A=C, A>D, B>D, C>D. ('>' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Thanks, here's an example:
1000 ABCD
100 CABD
10:1 supermajority.
Using the Smith/Condorcet method:
1000:100 B:C
110:0 A:B
100:100 C:A
A wins, my hypothesi
Buddha Buck wrote:
> The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not
> defeated by any option outside the Smith Set.
This definition of the Smith set is incorrect. Suppose we have:
A>B, B>C, A=C, A>D, B>D, C>D. ('>' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Then by your defini
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:46:00AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand
> enough about what's meant by "pairwise contests" to agree with
> the Condorcet criterion.
The Smith criterion implies the Condorcet criterion, btw.
Pairwise contests just
> > I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:51:28AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly.
> The SC method I described said "drop the weakest defeat from the Smith
> set until there is an undefeated
> > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > B wins.
>
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > This isn't correc
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise
> contests), that option should be the winner.
>
> Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith
> Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterion
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > > >
I'm about to leave town for the weekend, so I don't have time to answer
too many of these in detail. For now, I'll respond to one comment by
Raul:
> I'm uncomfortable saying if I've agreed to this. The Smith/Condorcet
> criteria that Buddha posted is not something I've agreed to. So,
> discus
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > > > B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
>
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > > B wins.
> Mechanis
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:53:29AM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
> A>B, B>C, A=C, A>D, B>D, C>D. ('>' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Thanks, here's an example:
1000 ABCD
100 CABD
10:1 supermajority.
Using the Smith/Condorcet method:
1000:100 B:C
110:0 A:B
100:100 C:A
A wins, my hypothes
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > This isn't co
Buddha Buck wrote:
> The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not
> defeated by any option outside the Smith Set.
This definition of the Smith set is incorrect. Suppose we have:
A>B, B>C, A=C, A>D, B>D, C>D. ('>' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Then by your defin
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > B wins.
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > 10: 0 B:C
> > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This isn't correct: A wins by being
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:46:00AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand
> enough about what's meant by "pairwise contests" to agree with
> the Condorcet criterion.
The Smith criterion implies the Condorcet criterion, btw.
Pairwise contests just
> > I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:51:28AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly.
> The SC method I described said "drop the weakest defeat from the Smith
> set until there is an undefeate
> > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > B wins.
>
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > This isn't corre
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
> Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise
> contests), that option should be the winner.
>
> Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith
> Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterio
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
> > > > > > > 10: 0 B:C
> > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B
> > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C
> > > > > >
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