On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: > > > The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that > > > pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no > > > supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
> > That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:35:45PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: > "All things considered" just being: > > -- it doesn't deal with supermajorities > -- it doesn't deal with quorum issues > -- it doesn't state what should happen if there isn't a single option > that pairwise beats every other option. I was refering to this last one. > > > It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion > > > doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) > > > > I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion > > is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). > > If A.6(3) is supposed to reduce the options to the Smith set, it is > very poorly written. I guess this depends on whether you think that Dominates means "pairwise beats" or "transitively beats". I think it means "transitively beats". I do see that other people (you, anthony) disagree with me, and I think that's sufficient reason to consider a constitutional amendment to resolve this issue. [I'd like to achieve agreement on a few other issues, however, before I propose anything formal.] Thanks, -- Raul
