On 12/15/14, 4:24 AM, A. Schulze wrote:

wietse:

DMARC "verifies" the From: header against SPF, DKIM or both, but
only a poorly-informed person would require that the From: address
*always* verifies with SPF.

for that reason it's more important the existing DKIM signature
is still valid when the mlm redistribute the message to all subscribers.

Unfortunately there are some rare situations a message must be modified.
Well known example: Mailman sometimes change the message encoding.
Not so often known: The mlm MTA submit to a subcriber MTA not capable 8BITMIME.

In the last case a message is also modified and will not pass DMARC test
even if the MLM host is known to "usually" not modifying messages.

Actually, I find that it is "normal" for the mailing list manager to make changes that will cause the message to fail a DKIM signature, and if fact it is required by law in some jurisdiction (some jurisdiction REQUIRE an unsubscribe link in every message from a mailing list). It is also very common to add a list code to the subject for filtering.

And exactly to debug such situations I with postfix could log
"here is a message with 8 bit content and the remote MTA does not
announce 8BITMIME. I have to recode the message and that will invalidate
  potential existing DKIM signatures"

The other option is to convert every message to 7bit before signing.
Doesn't sound as a strategy for the future ...

It would be unreasonable to expect that mailing list managers replace
the From: address of mailing list postings to match the list server's
IP addresses.

Ehm,
ironically that's exactly the solution preferred on the dmarc-discuss ml :-/

Andreas
Yes, From replacement is currently, at least one of, the preferred method to handle DMARC issues with mailing list, as proposed by the DMARC group and the major mail systems
that are causing the DMARC problem.

--
Richard Damon

Reply via email to