Zitat von "James B. Byrne" <byrn...@harte-lyne.ca>:

On Sun, December 14, 2014 20:05, Richard Damon wrote:

DMARC says that if a domain requests DMARC protection then any message
that has a RFC5322 domain pointing to it, must be verifiable as coming
from that domain, thus such an address can NOT use a 3rd party (like a
mailing list manager) to deliver a message for it without adding it to
SPF or giving it the DKIM signing keys.

Since DMARC was intended to protect "high value" emails, like from
something like a bank, this wouldn't normally be a problem. Effectively
emails from a DMARC protected domain shouldn't be used for non-official
communication, and any 3rd party service is presumably trusted so you
can make the needed arrangements. The problem is that YAHOO and AOL
have, via their DMARC settings, declared emails from their domain to be
this type of high value, and in effect that their users are not to use
3rd party distribution methods (but haven't told their users this).

Other mailing list systems have adopted some work arounds for this
problem, a common one is to "munge" the From: line to be the list
address (and setting Reply-To: to the poster), or wrapping the message
in a wrapper that is from the list, and the message to be distributed is
included as an attachment. (And some will just reject any message from a
domain that uses DMARC protection)

The problem isn't really with DMARC, it is doing what it was intended to
do, the problem is the services misusing DMARC. It sounds like if
pushed, they will even admit that they are abusing it, but feel they
need to due to a lot of messages being forged as from them.

Yes, it is arguably a violation of the RFC's to rewrite the From:
address of a message going through a mailing list manager, but it is one
of the ways to handle the misuse of DMARC that has happened. It comes
down to a question of what are you willing to do to make things "work"
and who are you willing to make bear the brunt of problems.


DMARC was forced upon the IETF by the big mail hosting companies.  The reason
that the FROM header is checked instead of the SENDER is because the FROM is
what virtually all MUA's display to the end user; and that is what the mail
hosting companies want verified.  Banks and other 'high value' email sources
are red-herrings.  They could care less.  Nothing of any import is ever sent
by email from a bank; Or by anyone else that has any sense (PGP/GPG/SMIME
users excepted, maybe).

DMARC is doing exactly what was expected of it by the people pushing-for /
forcing its adoption.  It is also breaking every mailing list manager exactly
as was predicted.  Mailman MLM has since had a mod made to rewrite the from
and set a few other switches to handle SPF.


So DMARC is just another piece of junk invented to break e-mail or the rest of it...

I don't get it why people still resist in using working solutions for "high value" e-mail like S/MIME and PGP and instead try to use broken-by-design "solutions" like SPF/DMARC whatever.

No average user understand any of this DMARC/SPF whatever cruft so they one day simply will use Google or Hotmail because most thers will also do in the hope the big ones will do something right about it.

Regards

Andreas



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