Yep, that’s the stuff.  I didn’t see it in this diff.

Joe

From: mohamed.boucad...@orange.com <mohamed.boucad...@orange.com>
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2024 at 09:40
To: Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jcla...@cisco.com>, opsawg@ietf.org <opsawg@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3
Re-,

Deal. I updated the module accordingly. I also sent a note right now to the 
authors of T+TLS to cover this in this base spec.

For the list point, we used to have multiple addresses under the same instance 
but removed it because you convinced me that this adds more complexity as we 
can define those as separate server instances (and that redundancy group can be 
handled at the server instance levels):

OLD:
    +--rw remote-address* [address]
    |  +--rw address        inet:ip-address
    |  +--rw port-number?   inet:port-number

Are you referring to this or something else? Thanks.

Cheers,
Med

De : Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jcla...@cisco.com>
Envoyé : jeudi 12 décembre 2024 15:30
À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <mohamed.boucad...@orange.com>; opsawg@ietf.org
Objet : Re: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3

As a contributor, I agree.  I think from a security point of view a fallback to 
an insecure state should be strongly discouraged.

Also, you mentioned you were going to address the list thing in the module when 
it comes to how T+ servers are defined.  I didn’t see that in this new draft.

Joe

From: mohamed.boucad...@orange.com<mailto:mohamed.boucad...@orange.com> 
<mohamed.boucad...@orange.com<mailto:mohamed.boucad...@orange.com>>
Date: Thursday, December 12, 2024 at 09:11
To: Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jcla...@cisco.com<mailto:jcla...@cisco.com>>, 
opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org> 
<opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3
Hi Joe,

You are right. The reason I had this is that we don’t have explicit text that 
fallback when TLS fails is forbidden.

We do have in the base spec the following, which recommends against (but still 
that’s not forbidden):

   It is NOT RECOMMENDED that TLS TACACS+ servers and Non-TLS TACACS+
   servers be deployed on the same host, for reasons discussed in
   Section 5.3.  Non-TLS connections would be better served by deploying
   the required Non-TLS TACACS+ servers on separate hosts.

If we add an explicit statement in the base T+TLS spec that fall back is not 
allowed, I think that we can remove tls/non-tls stats, which is simpler.

Cheers,
Med

De : Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jcla...@cisco.com<mailto:jcla...@cisco.com>>
Envoyé : jeudi 12 décembre 2024 14:47
À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET 
<mohamed.boucad...@orange.com<mailto:mohamed.boucad...@orange.com>>; 
opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>
Objet : Re: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3

Thanks, Med.  Looks good, but I wonder why we need a set of TLS and non-TLS 
statistics?  Those stats are per-server, so if the server is TLS, then the 
extra stats will be there.  If not, then you have just the base stats.

Joe

From: mohamed.boucad...@orange.com<mailto:mohamed.boucad...@orange.com> 
<mohamed.boucad...@orange.com<mailto:mohamed.boucad...@orange.com>>
Date: Wednesday, December 11, 2024 at 07:41
To: Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jcla...@cisco.com<mailto:jcla...@cisco.com>>, 
opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org> 
<opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3
Hi Joe,

Please find a proposal to address both SNI/stats comments discussed below: 
https://author-tools.ietf.org/api/iddiff?doc_1=draft-ietf-opsawg-secure-tacacs-yang&url_2=https://boucadair.github.io/secure-tacacs-yang/draft-ietf-opsawg-secure-tacacs-yang.txt

Your feedback is welcome. Thanks.

Cheers,
Med

De : Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jcla...@cisco.com<mailto:jcla...@cisco.com>>
Envoyé : mercredi 23 octobre 2024 14:38
À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET 
<mohamed.boucad...@orange.com<mailto:mohamed.boucad...@orange.com>>; 
opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>
Objet : Re: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3



Why do you define a new grouping, tcp-server-info?  Why not just augment what 
is in 9105?  This adds complexity with minimal, if any, benefit that I see.
[Med] 9105 does not have a list. The initial intent was to cover when there are 
more addresses to reach the same server identifier by the same domain-name for 
redundancy and so on. We could configure two sever entries, but then all the 
credentials will need to be repeated for each member of the group. Also, if 
there is a procedure to fall back when an instance is not responsive, that will 
be difficult to control with the separate entries. Would that makes sense?

[JMC] No, 9105 doesn’t have a list of addresses to refer to a single server.  
That said, in my experience I haven’t needed that.  I accomplish redundancy via 
multiple server instances (where they sync state or have a common config 
database).  I don’t know that having multiple addresses per instance adds a lot 
of practical value vs. The added complexity and possible confusion.

Does the new domain-name leaf need to be mandatory if certs are used?
[Med] I don’t think so as DNS-ID and IP-ID are allowed for identification. No?
This prompted me that a check is needed when SNI is enabled but we don’t have a 
knob to control SNI activation. I think we need one.

[JMC] Thanks for the confirmation.  Yes, SNI would be a good thing to cover.

Finally, on operational data, should this module introduce any TLS-specific 
stats in addition to those in 9105?  I feel like certificate issues or PSK 
problems might be useful.
[Med] Good point. Will cover this in future iterations.

[JMC] Thanks !  Last night I was thinking having stats on server vs. client 
auth failures would be helpful.

Joe


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