Hi Joe,

Thanks for the comments.

Please see inline.

Cheers,
Med

De : Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jclarke=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>
Envoyé : mardi 22 octobre 2024 17:16
À : Joe Clarke (jclarke) <jclarke=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>; opsawg@ietf.org
Objet : [OPSAWG]Re: CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access 
Controller Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3

As a contributor…

I support the adoption of this work as I feel it will help inform the overall 
T+ TLS 1.3 specification.  I have some specific comments and nits, though:

Abstract:

s/This modules augments/This module augments/
[Med] ACK

Section 1:

Do you need to state that the first version of this spec used a pruning 
approach?  Ultimately, when this is published that won’t matter.
[Med] The plan is to remove this note in future versions.

In the module itself, I’d like a few abbreviations expanded in the descriptions:

leaf target-kdf ==> expand KDF

container ca-certs ==> expand CA (yeah, I know)

container ee-certs ==> expand EE

[Med] ACK

Why do you define a new grouping, tcp-server-info?  Why not just augment what 
is in 9105?  This adds complexity with minimal, if any, benefit that I see.
[Med] 9105 does not have a list. The initial intent was to cover when there are 
more addresses to reach the same server identifier by the same domain-name for 
redundancy and so on. We could configure two sever entries, but then all the 
credentials will need to be repeated for each member of the group. Also, if 
there is a procedure to fall back when an instance is not responsive, that will 
be difficult to control with the separate entries. Would that makes sense?

Does the new domain-name leaf need to be mandatory if certs are used?
[Med] I don’t think so as DNS-ID and IP-ID are allowed for identification. No?
This prompted me that a check is needed when SNI is enabled but we don’t have a 
knob to control SNI activation. I think we need one.

Finally, on operational data, should this module introduce any TLS-specific 
stats in addition to those in 9105?  I feel like certificate issues or PSK 
problems might be useful.
[Med] Good point. Will cover this in future iterations.

Joe

From: Joe Clarke (jclarke) 
<jclarke=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:jclarke=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Date: Tuesday, October 22, 2024 at 09:24
To: opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org> 
<opsawg@ietf.org<mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>>
Subject: [OPSAWG]CALL FOR ADOPTION: A YANG Model for Terminal Access Controller 
Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) over TLS 1.3
The IPR poll has concluded (no known IPR has been disclosed), and we would like 
to start a two week adoption poll for 
draft-boucadair-opsawg-secure-tacacs-yang<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-boucadair-opsawg-secure-tacacs-yang/>.
  Please respond on-list with support and especially comments.

The adoption call will run until November 5.

Thanks.

Joe

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