> On 12. Mar 2020, at 23:14, Vittorio Bertocci <vitto...@auth0.com> wrote: > > Rotation can be used to detect leakage, right? Client credentials offer more > guarantees, but unless you are using private JWTs with a non exportable > certificate as client cred, a classic client secret _could_ technically leak. > Having rotation would alert you if someone got a hold on those. Admittedly > it’s a stretch, but not entirely inconceivable.
I would rather recommend use of public key based client authentication methods instead of RT rotation. > > On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 13:57 Torsten Lodderstedt > <torsten=40lodderstedt....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > Then why are you rotating refresh tokens? > >> Am 12.03.2020 um 20:48 schrieb Pedro Igor Silva <psi...@redhat.com>: >> >> >> A confidential client, as per the `web application` definition in Section >> `2.1. Client Types`. >> >> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 4:39 PM Torsten Lodderstedt >> <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote: >> Is that a public client? >> >>> Am 12.03.2020 um 20:32 schrieb Pedro Igor Silva <psi...@redhat.com>: >>> >>> >>> I agree with you and recently, we had to deal with an issue where a `web >>> application` using rotation (as defined by the draft) was having issues to >>> refresh tokens due to multiple concurrent requests at the moment a token is >>> about to expire or already expired.. We had to add some controls to deal >>> with concurrency and additional complexity + performance penalties. And for >>> such clients, I was not sure whether or not rotation makes sense. >>> >>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 4:05 PM Vittorio Bertocci >>> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >>> Thanks for the clarification, Torsten. >>> I believe it's the first time I see use of client credentials positioned as >>> sender constraint; if the intent is saying that confidential clients should >>> use their credentials when redeeming refresh tokens, I am of course in >>> agreement but I think the language should be clearer and state the above >>> explicitly. >>> >>> Re: failure frequency, I know of scenarios were the designers added >>> rotation by default, and after a while it was turned to opt in because of >>> the frequency of errors and impact on user experience/call center. >>> I really believe that putting this as a MUST is justified only for >>> exceedingly vulnerable situations, like SPAs. >>> Native/desktop clients should be free to decide whether they want to opt in >>> without loosing compliance. Just my 2 C >>> >>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 11:58 AM Torsten Lodderstedt >>> <torsten=40lodderstedt....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> sender constraining refresh tokens for confidential client means client >>> authentication + check the binding of the refresh token with the respective >>> client id. I don’t think this is new as RFC6759 already required ASs to >>> check this binding. Assuming backends are generally confidential clients >>> also means no rotation and no cache synchronization needed. >>> >>> Rotation should be used for frontends, e.g. native apps and only if there >>> is there no other option. If a refresh fails, the app must go through the >>> authorization process again. That’s inconvenient so the question is how >>> often this happens. What I can say, I have never seen customer complaining >>> in several years of operation of ASs with refresh token rotation (including >>> replay detection) for native apps with millions of users. >>> >>> best regards, >>> Torsten. >>> >>>> Am 12.03..2020 um 19:24 schrieb Vittorio Bertocci >>>> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf..org>: >>>> >>>> >>>> Hey guys, >>>> thanks for putting this together. >>>> I am concerned with the real world impact of imposing sender constraint | >>>> rotation as a MUST on refresh tokens in every scenario. >>>> Sender constraint isn't immediately actionable - we just had the >>>> discussion for dPOP, hence I won't go in the details here. >>>> Rotation isn't something that can be added without significant impact on >>>> development and runtime experiences: >>>> • on distributed scenarios, it introduces the need to serialize access >>>> to shared caches >>>> • network failures can lead to impact on experience- stranding clients >>>> which fail to receive RTn+1 during RTn redemption in a limbo where user >>>> interaction might become necessary, disrupting experience or functionality >>>> for scenarios where the user isn't available to respond. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 5:28 PM Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki..com> wrote: >>>> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first >>>> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on >>>> the list and incorporated that into the draft. >>>> >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01 >>>> >>>> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be >>>> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below. >>>> >>>> > This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749), >>>> > OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange >>>> > (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps >>>> > (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current >>>> > Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage >>>> > (RFC6750). >>>> > >>>> > Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the >>>> > original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with >>>> > the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed >>>> > entirely. >>>> > >>>> > A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below: >>>> > >>>> > * The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality >>>> > from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the >>>> > authorization code grant according to this specification requires >>>> > the addition of the PKCE mechanism >>>> > >>>> > * Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per >>>> > Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> > >>>> > * The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this >>>> > specification as per Section 2.1.2 of >>>> > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> > >>>> > * The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this >>>> > specification as per Section 2.4 of >>>> > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> > >>>> > * Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query >>>> > string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of >>>> > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> > >>>> > * Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use >>>> > as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12 >>>> >>>> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a >>>> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that >>>> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future >>>> discussions! >>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Aaron Parecki >>>> aaronparecki.com >>>> @aaronpk >>>> >>>> P.S. This notice was also posted at >>>> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1 >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
