> The Security BCP recommends S256. Is a recommendation enough to change the default? That's definitely normative changes from PKCE. I could be convinced either way, but it would be the first place that 2.1 deviates from the combination of the RFCs and BCPs.
---- Aaron Parecki aaronparecki.com @aaronpk On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 2:01 PM Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote: > > > > > Am 12.03.2020 um 21:59 schrieb Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki.com>: > > > > > >> > >> In regards to `code_challenge_method` parameter in authorization requests. > >> Wouldn't make more sense to have the default value as `S256` based on the > >> statement in Section `4.1.1.2. Client Creates the PKCE Code Challenge` > >> that says that `S256` is MTI on the server? > >> So you have `plain` as a special case for clients not able to support a > >> more strong code challenge? > > > > One of the goals of this draft was to consolidate the information > > available in the related extensions and BCPs, not actually define > > anything new itself. This behavior described would be different from > > what is described in PKCE. If this is a good idea to change the > > default, then that should be included in the Security BCP and brought > > into 2.1 from there. > > The Security BCP recommends S256. > > > > > ---- > > Aaron Parecki > > aaronparecki.com > > @aaronpk > > > >> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:22 PM Pedro Igor Craveiro e Silva > >> <pigor.crave...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >> Hi Aaron, > >> > >> In regards to `code_challenge_method` parameter in authorization requests. > >> Wouldn't make more sense to have the default value as `S256` based on the > >> statement in Section `4.1.1.2. Client Creates the PKCE Code Challenge` > >> that says that `S256` is MTI on the server? > >> > >> So you have `plain` as a special case for clients not able to support a > >> more strong code challenge? > >> > >> Regards. > >> Pedro Igor > >> > >>> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 9:29 PM Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki.com> wrote: > >>> > >>> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first > >>> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on > >>> the list and incorporated that into the draft. > >>> > >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01 > >>> > >>> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be > >>> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below. > >>> > >>>> This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749), > >>>> OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange > >>>> (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps > >>>> (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current > >>>> Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage > >>>> (RFC6750). > >>>> > >>>> Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the > >>>> original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with > >>>> the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed > >>>> entirely. > >>>> > >>>> A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below: > >>>> > >>>> * The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality > >>>> from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the > >>>> authorization code grant according to this specification requires > >>>> the addition of the PKCE mechanism > >>>> > >>>> * Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per > >>>> Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > >>>> > >>>> * The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this > >>>> specification as per Section 2.1.2 of > >>>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > >>>> > >>>> * The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this > >>>> specification as per Section 2.4 of > >>>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > >>>> > >>>> * Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query > >>>> string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of > >>>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > >>>> > >>>> * Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use > >>>> as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > >>> > >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12 > >>> > >>> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a > >>> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that > >>> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future > >>> discussions! > >>> > >>> ---- > >>> Aaron Parecki > >>> aaronparecki.com > >>> @aaronpk > >>> > >>> P.S. This notice was also posted at > >>> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1 > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> OAuth mailing list > >>> OAuth@ietf.org > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > OAuth@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
