> Am 12.03.2020 um 21:59 schrieb Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki.com>: > > >> >> In regards to `code_challenge_method` parameter in authorization requests.. >> Wouldn't make more sense to have the default value as `S256` based on the >> statement in Section `4.1.1.2. Client Creates the PKCE Code Challenge` that >> says that `S256` is MTI on the server? >> So you have `plain` as a special case for clients not able to support a more >> strong code challenge? > > One of the goals of this draft was to consolidate the information > available in the related extensions and BCPs, not actually define > anything new itself. This behavior described would be different from > what is described in PKCE. If this is a good idea to change the > default, then that should be included in the Security BCP and brought > into 2.1 from there.
The Security BCP recommends S256. > > ---- > Aaron Parecki > aaronparecki.com > @aaronpk > >> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:22 PM Pedro Igor Craveiro e Silva >> <pigor.crave...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi Aaron, >> >> In regards to `code_challenge_method` parameter in authorization requests.. >> Wouldn't make more sense to have the default value as `S256` based on the >> statement in Section `4.1.1.2. Client Creates the PKCE Code Challenge` that >> says that `S256` is MTI on the server? >> >> So you have `plain` as a special case for clients not able to support a more >> strong code challenge? >> >> Regards. >> Pedro Igor >> >>> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 9:29 PM Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki.com> wrote: >>> >>> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first >>> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on >>> the list and incorporated that into the draft. >>> >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01 >>> >>> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be >>> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below. >>> >>>> This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749), >>>> OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange >>>> (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps >>>> (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current >>>> Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage >>>> (RFC6750). >>>> >>>> Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the >>>> original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with >>>> the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed >>>> entirely. >>>> >>>> A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below: >>>> >>>> * The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality >>>> from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the >>>> authorization code grant according to this specification requires >>>> the addition of the PKCE mechanism >>>> >>>> * Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per >>>> Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> >>>> * The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this >>>> specification as per Section 2.1.2 of >>>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> >>>> * The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this >>>> specification as per Section 2.4 of >>>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> >>>> * Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query >>>> string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of >>>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>> >>>> * Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use >>>> as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>> >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12 >>> >>> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a >>> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that >>> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future >>> discussions! >>> >>> ---- >>> Aaron Parecki >>> aaronparecki.com >>> @aaronpk >>> >>> P.S. This notice was also posted at >>> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1 >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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