Is that a public client?
> Am 12.03.2020 um 20:32 schrieb Pedro Igor Silva <psi...@redhat.com>: > > > I agree with you and recently, we had to deal with an issue where a `web > application` using rotation (as defined by the draft) was having issues to > refresh tokens due to multiple concurrent requests at the moment a token is > about to expire or already expired. We had to add some controls to deal with > concurrency and additional complexity + performance penalties. And for such > clients, I was not sure whether or not rotation makes sense. > >> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 4:05 PM Vittorio Bertocci >> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >> Thanks for the clarification, Torsten. >> I believe it's the first time I see use of client credentials positioned as >> sender constraint; if the intent is saying that confidential clients should >> use their credentials when redeeming refresh tokens, I am of course in >> agreement but I think the language should be clearer and state the above >> explicitly. >> >> Re: failure frequency, I know of scenarios were the designers added rotation >> by default, and after a while it was turned to opt in because of the >> frequency of errors and impact on user experience/call center. >> I really believe that putting this as a MUST is justified only for >> exceedingly vulnerable situations, like SPAs. >> Native/desktop clients should be free to decide whether they want to opt in >> without loosing compliance. Just my 2 C >> >>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 11:58 AM Torsten Lodderstedt >>> <torsten=40lodderstedt....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> sender constraining refresh tokens for confidential client means client >>> authentication + check the binding of the refresh token with the respective >>> client id. I don’t think this is new as RFC6759 already required ASs to >>> check this binding. Assuming backends are generally confidential clients >>> also means no rotation and no cache synchronization needed. >>> >>> Rotation should be used for frontends, e.g. native apps and only if there >>> is there no other option. If a refresh fails, the app must go through the >>> authorization process again. That’s inconvenient so the question is how >>> often this happens. What I can say, I have never seen customer complaining >>> in several years of operation of ASs with refresh token rotation (including >>> replay detection) for native apps with millions of users. >>> >>> best regards, >>> Torsten. >>> >>>>> Am 12.03..2020 um 19:24 schrieb Vittorio Bertocci >>>>> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>: >>>>> >>>> >>>> Hey guys, >>>> thanks for putting this together. >>>> I am concerned with the real world impact of imposing sender constraint | >>>> rotation as a MUST on refresh tokens in every scenario. >>>> Sender constraint isn't immediately actionable - we just had the >>>> discussion for dPOP, hence I won't go in the details here. >>>> Rotation isn't something that can be added without significant impact on >>>> development and runtime experiences: >>>> on distributed scenarios, it introduces the need to serialize access to >>>> shared caches >>>> network failures can lead to impact on experience- stranding clients which >>>> fail to receive RTn+1 during RTn redemption in a limbo where user >>>> interaction might become necessary, disrupting experience or functionality >>>> for scenarios where the user isn't available to respond. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 5:28 PM Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki..com> wrote: >>>>> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first >>>>> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on >>>>> the list and incorporated that into the draft. >>>>> >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01 >>>>> >>>>> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be >>>>> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below. >>>>> >>>>> > This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749), >>>>> > OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange >>>>> > (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps >>>>> > (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current >>>>> > Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage >>>>> > (RFC6750). >>>>> > >>>>> > Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the >>>>> > original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with >>>>> > the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed >>>>> > entirely. >>>>> > >>>>> > A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below: >>>>> > >>>>> > * The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality >>>>> > from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the >>>>> > authorization code grant according to this specification requires >>>>> > the addition of the PKCE mechanism >>>>> > >>>>> > * Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per >>>>> > Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>>> > >>>>> > * The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this >>>>> > specification as per Section 2.1.2 of >>>>> > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>>> > >>>>> > * The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this >>>>> > specification as per Section 2.4 of >>>>> > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>>> > >>>>> > * Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query >>>>> > string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of >>>>> > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>>> > >>>>> > * Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use >>>>> > as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] >>>>> >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12 >>>>> >>>>> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a >>>>> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that >>>>> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future >>>>> discussions! >>>>> >>>>> ---- >>>>> Aaron Parecki >>>>> aaronparecki.com >>>>> @aaronpk >>>>> >>>>> P.S. This notice was also posted at >>>>> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1 >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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