> 1. Why are you here? What are you trying to solve that is not already
> addressed by existing specifications (OAuth 1.0a, WRAP, etc)?

I would like to see OAuth 1.0 extended to support more methods for obtaining 
tokens to optimize usability for non-web-based clients. I also want to clean 
the overall architecture and simplify parts of the spec that were originally 
designed to work on very limited platforms. I am also concerned about the 
security implications of WRAP adoption as currently written. 
 
> 2. Should the WG start by taking WRAP or OAuth 1.0a as its starting point?
> Something else?

Strictly from an editor's perspective, OAuth 1.0a (as documented in the 
recently approved draft-hammer-oauth RFC) offers the best narrative to build 
on. The document has gone through many revisions and reflects over a year of 
work on top of the original OAuth specification. It would be easier to add the 
new methods of obtaining a token into OAuth, than to rewrite WRAP to reach the 
same level of document maturity.
 
> 3. If we start from draft-hammer-oauth, what needs to change to turn it into
> OAuth 2.0?

To start with, adding all the new flows in WRAP to make it feature complete. 
The authentication section needs to be cleaned up and incorporate a new message 
format for signing (similar to Brian's proposal), as well as remove the need to 
use the client credentials for accessing resources. It also needs to replace 
PLAINTEXT with a simpler, cleaner bearer token solution that does not require 
reading the entire specification to implement.
 
> 4. If we start from draft-hardt-oauth, what needs to change to turn it into
> OAuth 2.0?

The primary issues are similar to the OAuth specification in how parameters are 
sent, named, as well as lacking any support for signatures.

Ignoring the early stage of the draft, the document needs more clarity in its 
terminology. It uses an architecture that is not fully explained or specified, 
leaving too much for the implementer to figure out. For example, WRAP doesn't 
directly support the separation of the token issuer from the resource server 
because it doesn't explain how such a decoupling can be implemented in practice.
 
> 5. Do you think the approach of working first on 'how to use a token' and
> then on 'how to get a token' is right?

I am not sure anymore. It has not worked so far, and it seems people are not 
motivated to engage this effort because they don't see how all the pieces come 
together. It looks like taking one of the two specs (1.0a or WRAP) and starting 
to revise it frequently until it is feature complete is going to get people 
more engaged.
 
> 6. Should we go back to working on a single specification?

Yes. Same as the previous answer. I am still not sure if we should end up 
publishing a single specification, but when we are done, we can ask the 
opposite question if the 'how to use a token' section is more useful on its own.

> 7. Do you think the protocol should include a signature-based authentication
> scheme?

Yes.

I agree that a bearer token over SSL/TLS offers more than an HMAC-based 
signature over non-secure channel. I personally don't see much value in the 
HMAC signature because any token-issuing server will have to support SSL/TLS 
for sending tokens in the first place. So the argument that we need to support 
servers without SSL/TLS is false (note that draft-hammer-oauth as approved 
requires SSL/TLS for all plaintext secrets). I don't know enough to say if the 
argument that HMAC is cheaper/faster/easier than always using SSL/TLS is true 
or not.

What I am interested in is support for asymmetric secrets because that's the 
only way I know to avoid the need for client registration, without giving up 
completely on client identity verification. But since this requires a signature 
process, defining an HMAC option becomes just a matter of a few more lines. In 
other words, if we support an RSA-SHA1-like method, we might as well also 
support HMAC. I posted my use case for this separately.

EHL


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