On Thu, Feb 28, 2013 at 11:48:06PM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote: > Let me formulate my point more clearly -- Microsoft very likely going to > sign hello world EFI PE binary, no matter the contents of .keylist > section, as they don't give a damn about this section, as it has zero > semantic value to them, right? > > They sign the binary. By signing the binary, they are *NOT* establishing > cryptographic chain of trust to the key stored in .keylist, but your > patchset seems to imply so.
Mr Evil Blackhat's binary is then a mechanism for circumventing the Windows trust mechanism, and as such his account is subject to termination and his binary can be added to dbx. We'd check the binary hash against dbx and refuse to load it on systems that have received the update, and Mr Evil Blackhat would have to find a new bunch of identity documents to create a new account to repeat the process. -- Matthew Garrett | mj...@srcf.ucam.org -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
