On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > Let me formulate my point more clearly -- Microsoft very likely going to > > sign hello world EFI PE binary, no matter the contents of .keylist > > section, as they don't give a damn about this section, as it has zero > > semantic value to them, right? > > > > They sign the binary. By signing the binary, they are *NOT* establishing > > cryptographic chain of trust to the key stored in .keylist, but your > > patchset seems to imply so. > > Mr Evil Blackhat's binary is then a mechanism for circumventing the > Windows trust mechanism,
Yes, the "hello world" one. But the real harm is being done by the i_own_your_ring0.ko module, which can be modprobed on all the systems where the signed "hello world" binary has been keyctl-ed before it was blacklisted. In other words -- you blacklist the population of the key on systems by blakclisting the key-carrying binary, but the key remains trusted on whatever system the binary has been processed by keyctl before. Right? If so, that's a clear difference from normal X.509 chain of trust (i.e. the difference between having the key signed, and having the binary signed). -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
