On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:45:23AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote: > On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be > > infected. There's not really any good way around that. > > Which is a very substantial difference to normal X509 chain of trust, > isn't it?
If you've loaded an x.509 certificate into the kernel and it's later revoked, any module signed with the key is going to be loadable until it's revoked. I don't see an especially large difference here? -- Matthew Garrett | mj...@srcf.ucam.org -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
