I still feel like there's an assumption of decoupling lying in wait. Humans are biologically
enmeshed in the biosphere. Traveling to Mars requires us to "simulate" the biosphere ...
like a kind of telemetry injection, artificially provide O2 like Gaia does, recycle waste back into
"fresh" product to consume, etc.
So what "replace humans" means is a bit up in the air. Replacing humans by
enmeshing the new creature in the biosphere is one thing (Theseus' ship cyborgs).
Replacing humans with virtual minds enmeshed in massive data centers is another thing.
Replacing them with steel, rubber, copper, plastic, etc. is yet another thing. For the
2nd and 3rd, will we have to provide the virtual minds or physical robots with a rich,
semi-self-restoring, context in which to embed them? Or can we develop them such that
they're *more* autonomous than we are ... with modules that are more universal than our
modules?
It seems to me that people who talk about such replacement without considering
what also replaces the context are merely fideistic or victims of wishful
thinking.
On 12/12/24 10:24, Marcus Daniels wrote:
Seems there are good reasons to replace humans.
1) Humans can’t easily travel to new planets due to radiation and hostile
environments.
2) Our appetite for energy is vast and our decadence unbounded. A rising
standard of living for all humans will accelerate this due to increased demands
for fossil fuels.
3) At least in the United States, our education system is not serving the whole
of the population effectively, leading to the election of people that make our
problems worse.
4) We can’t cooperate to solve or even identify real problems.
5) AI seems to be successfully harvesting human knowledge and extending it,
e.g. AlphaFold.
*From: *Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of Prof David West
<profw...@fastmail.fm>
*Date: *Thursday, December 12, 2024 at 10:16 AM
*To: *friam@redfish.com <friam@redfish.com>
*Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] Ramsification and Semantic Indeterminacy
Thank you Roger. Fascinating read. Moravec has evolved considerably from his /Mind
Children /(1990) days when he predicted we would all be "uploaded" to robot
bodies by now.
The University where I started my teaching career, St. Thomas in St. Paul MN,
recently announced a new center https://www.stthomas.edu/e
<https://www.stthomas.edu/e> AI for the Common Good. I just wrote them a 20
page missive that strangely paralleled the Moravec article as a caution and with
suggestions for where they might find success.
My very first professional publication was a two part article in AI Magazine
(then the journal of record for AI research). I did a lot of work with neural
nets and was heavily involved, academically/researching and
professionally/building, Expert Systems—the previous explosion of irrational
exuberance about AI. My Ph.D. dissertation included a model of cognition
derived from the topographic metaphor explaining neural nets and
incorporating culture as a force helping shape the topography of the net. vTAO,
virtual Topographic Adaptive Organism.
Moravec notes, that within the AI community, Winograd was a leader in suggesting that AI
should be used to augment humans and not replace them. It should be noted that others
have long advocated computing/computers should have the same goal: Vannevar Bush (1945),
Douglas Englebart (1962), Alan Kay (the Dynabook 1972), and Steve Jobs (computer as
"bicycle for the mind") are some examples.
One piece of advice I gave to St. Thomas was to focus on where the the
'intelligence' in current AI systems really is—training set tutors, prompt
engineers, and interpretation of generative outputs.
davew
On Thu, Dec 12, 2024, at 10:24 AM, Roger Critchlow wrote:
Hans Moravec kicks off a forum,
https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/the-ai-we-deserve/
<https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/the-ai-we-deserve/>, about why the
instrumentalist computer science and AI we inherited from DARPA grants isn't the only
possible version or the only version we need. Life is not entirely composed of self
aiming gun turrets and supply chains.
-- rec --
On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 7:19 AM glen <geprope...@gmail.com
<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Interesting. What was your prompt?
It's important to remember that Claude and GPT are prone to bullsh¡t.
When asked to compare apples to oranges, they will happily and confidently make
the comparison even if it's a category error. Leitgeb's footnote might be of
use:
"This motivation for Ramsifying classical semantics is orthogonal to
instrumentalist or
functionalist motivations: the point of Ramsey semantics is neither to
show that talk of
interpretation is merely instrumental nor to convey insights into the
‘nature’ of truth, but
to deal with semantic indeterminacy. In contrast, e.g., Wright’s [85]
paper on Ramsification
and monism-vs.-pluralism-about-truth does not apply Ramsification for
the sake of doing
semantics and in fact presupposes semantic determinacy (see [85], p.
272)."
where [85] is:
Wright, C. (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the pluralist’s revenge.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(2), 265–283.
https://philpapers.org/archive/writra.pdf
<https://philpapers.org/archive/writra.pdf>
On 12/11/24 21:55, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:
> Different strokes for different okes, indeed. In my realm of AI — and
previously in control systems — fuzzy logic has been the trusty spanner for
tackling vagueness. Seeking a fresh perspective, I turned to ChatGPT, which
delivered this thoughtful comparison:
>
> "Ramsey semantics and fuzzy logic both grapple with vagueness but chart
fundamentally different courses. Ramsey semantics clings to the rigorous shores of classical
logic and binary truth values (true/false), navigating semantic indeterminacy by emphasizing
the roles terms occupy rather than insisting on their precision, making it a philosophical
and theoretical endeavor. Meanwhile, fuzzy logic boldly abandons binary constraints,
introducing gradations of truth (e.g., 0.3 or 0.7), rendering it an elegant mathematical
tool for practical domains like control systems and AI. Where Ramsey semantics contemplates
the hazy edges of meaning, fuzzy logic quantifies vagueness as a smooth gradient between
truth and falsehood."
>
> I must admit, ChatGPT's knack for juxtaposing the lofty with the
practical was a pleasant surprise—perhaps an unintended nod to my eclectic career
path!
>
> On Thu, 12 Dec 2024 at 02:45, glen <geprope...@gmail.com
<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com
<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>
>
> https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3 <https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3>
<https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3 <https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3>>
>
> via https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us
<https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us> <https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us
<https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us>>
>
> I found this paper by Weinberg's post to Mastodon through the
write up of Leitbeg's projects here:
> https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en>
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en>>
> I didn't find any papers on scholar or philpapers talking
directly about the reference patterns of paradox through graph theory. But both
his composition of similarity and non-eliminative structuralism were graph heavy.
Good stuff. I have yet to read the ramsification paper. But, as usual, here's
Claude's summary of it:
>
> > - Classical semantics presupposes the existence of a unique
factually determined intended interpretation of a language. However, there are
reasons to doubt this presupposition holds in general, due to phenomena like
vagueness, structuralism in mathematics, and theory change in science.
> >
> > - The author proposes Ramsey semantics as an alternative that
avoids presupposing a unique intended interpretation. Instead, it merely postulates
the existence of an admissible interpretation from which truth is defined classically.
> >
> > - Formally, Ramsey semantics replaces the intended interpretation I in
classical semantics with an epsilon term εF(F∈Adm) that "picks" an interpretation
from the class Adm of admissible interpretations. Truth is then defined relative to this
interpretation.
> >
> > - Ramsey semantics preserves the key features of classical
semantics - classical logic, a classical concept of truth, compositionality,
bivalence, etc. But it allows the intended interpretation to be indeterminate when
Adm contains more than one member.
> >
> > - The author argues Ramsey semantics is closer to classical
semantics than supervaluationism while still allowing semantic indeterminacy. It
provides reasonable treatments of the Sorites paradox, higher-order vagueness, and
interpretational continuity between theories.
> >
> > - Overall, Ramsey semantics aims to capture the advantages of
classical semantics while being less risky, by not presupposing semantic determinacy.
It shows how semantic indeterminacy can be reconciled with an otherwise classical
approach to meaning and truth.
--
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