This goes back to the concept of "reasoning", I guess... and that folds back on itself
because the token "reason" is schematic ... a variable if we Ramsify it. To me, it calls
out for a tool. Claude's Console has that nice feature where you can program in your own tool.
Maybe rather than asking an LLM directly, you have a tool (similar to a call out to a compiler or
validator) that helps ensure an intra-query dialectic? Build advocate and contrarian tools and task
them with finding support or refutation for any given indeterminate reference, be it concept or
project.
Surely debate transcripts are part of the training material for lots of these models.
Even so, you could provide it "good" examples of such debates and tell it to
answer in such a style...
On 12/13/24 07:43, Marcus Daniels wrote:
When does a person or organization want to quantify how much uncertainty exists
in a proposition?
I could imagine a red-to-green gauge in an e-mail program or web browser that
would prioritize, or label content based on the degree of underspecification,
BS, or internal inconsistency therein. Maybe decision makers would be
interested in computing expected values (profitability) for outcomes based on
probability ranges or truthiness?
It seems to me that LLVMs give the building blocks one would need to
characterize distributions like this -- sample responses at finite temperature
and tabulate them. There is a tendency of commercial LLMs today to hedge and
not to commit to one interpretation. That’s what I really want in an advisor:
Someone that will commit to a position and give me piles of evidence for it
and counter evidence against it. Claude can be infuriating in how it will
just say “You’re right” and immediately abandon a coding approach. (Don’t
abandon it, convince me you are right.) Worse is if a LLM builds the response
around a hidden bias of the asker, picking up on subtle indications that the
user is an anti-vaxxer, and then feeding them anti-vaxxer propaganda. Now
that is a destructive and all too prevalent kind of nihilism these days.
*From: *Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of glen
<geprope...@gmail.com>
*Date: *Friday, December 13, 2024 at 6:52 AM
*To: *friam@redfish.com <friam@redfish.com>
*Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] Ramsification and Semantic Indeterminacy
I know most (all?) of you don't care. But here's a conversation with Claude
starting with the same prompt Pieter used with GPT. It's sad that I had to
*feed* the answer to Claude. The summary I posted earlier prompted with
Leitgeb's entire paper. Such prompt-responses tend to be more trustworthy
because the context is right there in the prompt. But clearly neither Claude
nor GPT could tell (or cared to tell?) that Ramsey Semantics is *meta*. Is it
bullsh¡t or condescension? 8^D Anyway, here it is:
me: "Please compare in one relatively short paragraph Ramsey semantics and fuzzy
logic."
claude-3.5-sonnet: "Ramsey semantics and fuzzy logic are two different approaches to
handling uncertainty and truth values in logic, but they operate on fundamentally
different principles. Ramsey semantics, developed by Frank Ramsey, deals with conditional
statements and their truth values based on belief updating and probability, focusing on
how we should change our beliefs when we learn new information. In contrast, fuzzy logic,
introduced by Lotfi Zadeh, allows for partial truth values between 0 and 1, rather than
just true or false, making it particularly useful for handling vague or imprecise
information where propositions can be partially true. While Ramsey semantics is more
closely tied to probability theory and belief revision, fuzzy logic is more concerned
with representing and reasoning about gradual properties and continuous-valued
logic."
me: "Given this footnote from Hannes Leitgeb's paper entitled Ramsification and
Semantic Indeterminacy: 'This motivation for Ramsifying classical semantics is orthogonal
to instrumentalist or functionalist motivations: the point of Ramsey semantics is neither
to show that talk of interpretation is merely instrumental nor to convey insights into
the ‘nature’ of truth, but to deal with semantic indeterminacy. In contrast, e.g.,
Wright’s [85] paper on Ramsification and monism-vs.-pluralism-about-truth does not apply
Ramsification for the sake of doing semantics and in fact presupposes semantic
determinacy (see [85], p. 272).' How would you change the above answer?"
claude-3.5-sonnet: "Here's a revised comparison that better reflects Leitgeb's
point: Ramsey semantics and fuzzy logic represent different approaches to handling
semantic uncertainty, but with distinct purposes and frameworks. Ramsey semantics, as
Leitgeb emphasizes, is specifically aimed at dealing with semantic indeterminacy in
classical semantics, rather than serving instrumentalist or functionalist goals about the
nature of truth. Fuzzy logic, on the other hand, introduced by Lotfi Zadeh, provides a
framework for handling vagueness through partial truth values between 0 and 1, operating
within a determined semantic framework. While both approaches deal with forms of
uncertainty, Ramsey semantics addresses fundamental semantic indeterminacy in classical
logic, whereas fuzzy logic works within established semantic frameworks to handle gradual
or imprecise truth values."
me: "OK. That's better. But what still seems to be missing is that Ramsey Semantics
and Fuzzy Logic are entirely different things and comparing them seems like a category
error. Ramsey Semantics is about schematic predicates where some conditions are not
satisfied (e.g. square root of -1, which is undefined). Fuzzy Logic is about continuous
values to true-false predicates assuming the predicate and all its conditions are
well-defined. Perhaps we might say Ramsey Semantics is meta-logical whereas Fuzzy Logic
is merely logical?"
claude-3.5-sonnet: "Yes, you've identified a crucial distinction I failed to capture. Here's a better comparison that acknowledges their fundamental difference: Comparing Ramsey semantics and fuzzy logic directly is somewhat of a category error, as they operate at different logical levels and address entirely different concerns. Ramsey semantics is a meta-logical framework dealing with semantic indeterminacy where predicates or conditions are undefined or not fully satisfied (like the square root of -1), focusing on the very meaning and interpretation of logical statements. Fuzzy logic, in contrast, operates at the logical level, providing a calculus for handling degrees of truth in well-defined predicates where all conditions are satisfied but truth values can be continuous rather than binary. While both deal with forms of uncertainty, they do so in fundamentally different domains: Ramsey semantics addresses meta-logical questions about meaning and interpretation, while
fuzzy logic provides tools for reasoning about gradual truth values within an already well-defined semantic framework."
On 12/12/24 22:36, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:
This is such an intriguing discussion, but regrettably, I don’t have the time to engage
fully. I do, however, want to quickly address Glen's question to me from way back at the
start of this thread about my prompt on Ramsey semantics and fuzzy logic. My prompt to
ChatGPT was: "Please compare in one relatively short paragraph Ramsey semantics and
fuzzy logic."
On Thu, 12 Dec 2024 at 16:20, glen <geprope...@gmail.com <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com
<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Interesting. What was your prompt?
It's important to remember that Claude and GPT are prone to bullsh¡t. When
asked to compare apples to oranges, they will happily and confidently make the
comparison even if it's a category error. Leitgeb's footnote might be of use:
"This motivation for Ramsifying classical semantics is orthogonal to
instrumentalist or
functionalist motivations: the point of Ramsey semantics is neither to
show that talk of
interpretation is merely instrumental nor to convey insights into the
‘nature’ of truth, but
to deal with semantic indeterminacy. In contrast, e.g., Wright’s [85]
paper on Ramsification
and monism-vs.-pluralism-about-truth does not apply Ramsification for the
sake of doing
semantics and in fact presupposes semantic determinacy (see [85], p. 272)."
where [85] is:
Wright, C. (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the pluralist’s revenge. Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 88(2), 265–283. https://philpapers.org/archive/writra.pdf
<https://philpapers.org/archive/writra.pdf> <https://philpapers.org/archive/writra.pdf
<https://philpapers.org/archive/writra.pdf>>
On 12/11/24 21:55, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:
> Different strokes for different okes, indeed. In my realm of AI — and
previously in control systems — fuzzy logic has been the trusty spanner for
tackling vagueness. Seeking a fresh perspective, I turned to ChatGPT, which
delivered this thoughtful comparison:
>
> "Ramsey semantics and fuzzy logic both grapple with vagueness but chart
fundamentally different courses. Ramsey semantics clings to the rigorous shores of classical
logic and binary truth values (true/false), navigating semantic indeterminacy by emphasizing
the roles terms occupy rather than insisting on their precision, making it a philosophical
and theoretical endeavor. Meanwhile, fuzzy logic boldly abandons binary constraints,
introducing gradations of truth (e.g., 0.3 or 0.7), rendering it an elegant mathematical
tool for practical domains like control systems and AI. Where Ramsey semantics contemplates
the hazy edges of meaning, fuzzy logic quantifies vagueness as a smooth gradient between
truth and falsehood."
>
> I must admit, ChatGPT's knack for juxtaposing the lofty with the
practical was a pleasant surprise—perhaps an unintended nod to my eclectic career
path!
>
> On Thu, 12 Dec 2024 at 02:45, glen <geprope...@gmail.com <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com
<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com
<mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>>>> wrote:
>
>
> https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3 <https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3>
<https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3 <https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3>>
<https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3 <https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3
<https://philpapers.org/rec/LEIRAS-3>>>
>
> via https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us <https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us>
<https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us <https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us>>
<https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us <https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us
<https://mastodon.social/@dailyn...@zirk.us>>>
>
> I found this paper by Weinberg's post to Mastodon through the write
up of Leitbeg's projects here:
> https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en>
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en>>
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en
<https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/person/85399322?language=en>>>
> I didn't find any papers on scholar or philpapers talking directly
about the reference patterns of paradox through graph theory. But both his
composition of similarity and non-eliminative structuralism were graph heavy. Good
stuff. I have yet to read the ramsification paper. But, as usual, here's Claude's
summary of it:
>
> > - Classical semantics presupposes the existence of a unique
factually determined intended interpretation of a language. However, there are
reasons to doubt this presupposition holds in general, due to phenomena like
vagueness, structuralism in mathematics, and theory change in science.
> >
> > - The author proposes Ramsey semantics as an alternative that
avoids presupposing a unique intended interpretation. Instead, it merely postulates
the existence of an admissible interpretation from which truth is defined classically.
> >
> > - Formally, Ramsey semantics replaces the intended interpretation I in
classical semantics with an epsilon term εF(F∈Adm) that "picks" an interpretation
from the class Adm of admissible interpretations. Truth is then defined relative to this
interpretation.
> >
> > - Ramsey semantics preserves the key features of classical
semantics - classical logic, a classical concept of truth, compositionality,
bivalence, etc. But it allows the intended interpretation to be indeterminate when
Adm contains more than one member.
> >
> > - The author argues Ramsey semantics is closer to classical
semantics than supervaluationism while still allowing semantic indeterminacy. It
provides reasonable treatments of the Sorites paradox, higher-order vagueness, and
interpretational continuity between theories.
> >
> > - Overall, Ramsey semantics aims to capture the advantages of
classical semantics while being less risky, by not presupposing semantic determinacy.
It shows how semantic indeterminacy can be reconciled with an otherwise classical
approach to meaning and truth.
--
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¡sıɹƎ ןıɐH ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ
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